tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-84435790468901350372024-03-05T21:03:06.255-05:00Think: Just Do It!Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.comBlogger342125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-73274421547779553532015-10-21T13:35:00.000-04:002015-10-21T13:35:02.648-04:00[HUM 3551] Whatever will be, will beIt is often said that the notion of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/" target="_blank">free will</a> is incompatible with <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/" target="_blank">causal determinism</a>, namely, "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature." But the notion of free will may also be incompatible with classical logic (more specifically, the principle of <i>bivalence </i>according to which, for any proposition <i>p</i>, either <i>p</i> is true or <i>p</i> is false), as Aristotle's discussion of the problem of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/future-contingents/" target="_blank">future contingents</a> suggests.<br />
<br />
Consider the following proposition:<br />
<ol>
<li>Neo will choose the red pill.</li>
</ol>
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On the one hand, if (1) is true, then Neo will choose the red pill and there is nothing he can do about it. On the other hand, if (1) is false, then it is not the case that Neo will choose the red pill and, again, there is nothing he can do about it. Either way, Neo cannot help but choose the red pill if (1) is true, or not choose the red pill if (1) is false, which means that Neo cannot choose freely.<br />
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What do you make of this argument? Does it show that the notion of free will is incompatible with classical logic (specifically, the principle of <i>bivalence</i>)? If so, which, if any, should we give up? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-51582443236693082592015-09-15T21:45:00.000-04:002015-09-15T21:45:14.882-04:00[HUM 2551] Is Newton the man? According to Perry et al (<a href="http://www.cengage.com/search/productOverview.do?N=11+147&Ntk=P_EPI&Ntt=7772330021393689344155322617089223262&Ntx=mode%2Bmatchallpartial" target="_blank">11th ed</a>.):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The civilizations of the ancient Near East were based on a way of thinking fundamentally different from the modern scientific outlook. The difference between scientific and mythical thinking is profound. The scientific mind views physical nature as an <i>it</i>—inanimate, impersonal, and governed by universal law. The mythmaking mind of the Near East saw every object in nature as a <i>thou</i>—personified, alive, with an individual will. It saw gods or demons manipulating things. The world was enchanted, imbued with mysterious spirits. […] Live agents were the forces behind natural events.</blockquote>
Now, <a href="https://youtu.be/danYFxGnFxQ" target="_blank">Neil deGrasse Tyson</a> thinks that Isaac Newton is the greatest physicist in history.<br />
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But Newton was engaged in what Perry et al would characterize as "mythical thinking." For example:<br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/newton-alchemist-newman.html" target="_blank">Newton thought that Greek myths encoded alchemical recipes</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/newton-dark-secrets.html" target="_blank">Newton thought that reactions between metals occurred because of invisible forces he called "active principles."</a></li>
<li><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/" target="_blank">Newton thought that God, an infinite being, is present throughout all of space throughout all of time</a>.</li>
</ul>
So, is the difference between mythical thinking and scientific thinking not as clear-cut as Perry et al claim? Or perhaps we should conclude instead that Newton was not a scientist after all?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-15918767427347304722015-04-29T09:38:00.003-04:002015-04-29T09:38:21.970-04:00[PHI 3000] What have I done to deserve this?The argument known as <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/hell/#H2" target="_blank"><i>The Problem of Hell</i></a> purports to show that the traditional conceptions of an omniperfect God (i.e., an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator) and damnation (i.e., eternal suffering in hell as retribution for sin) are incompatible. The argument goes roughly like this:<br />
<ol>
<li>An omniperfect God would damn a person to hell only if there is a sufficient justification for doing so.</li>
<li>There is no sufficient justification for damning a person to hell.</li>
<li>Therefore, an omniperfect God would not damn anyone to hell.</li>
</ol>
Premise (1) is true in virtue of the divine attributes. A morally perfect God would not allow unjustified suffering. An omniscient God would know whether any suffering is justified or not. And an omnipotent God would be able to prevent unjustified suffering from occurring.<br />
<br />
The key premise, then, is premise (2). Here is an argument for premise (2):<br />
<br />
<b>Argument I </b><br />
<ol>
<li>The punishment must fit the crime.</li>
<li>Damnation is eternal, whereas a life of crime (or sin) is finite.</li>
<li>Therefore, eternal damnation is not a fitting punishment for a finite life of crime (or sin). </li>
</ol>
In other words, if the punishment should be proportional to the crime committed, then damnation is clearly not a proportional punishment for a life of crime, since the former is eternal (without beginning or end; lasting forever), whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite suffering in hell cannot be a fitting punishment for a finite life of sin. If this is correct, then there is no sufficient justification for damning someone to hell. In other words, no one deserves to go to hell.<br />
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A similar point can be made about heaven. If heaven is supposed to be a deserved reward for a virtuous life, then no one could possibly deserve such a reward.<br />
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<b>Argument II</b><br />
<ol>
<li>The reward must fit the deed.</li>
<li>Heaven is eternal bliss, whereas a virtuous life is finite.</li>
<li>Therefore, eternal bliss is not a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue. </li>
</ol>
In other words, if the reward should be proportional to the deed, then heaven is clearly not a proportional reward for a virtuous life, since the former is eternal, whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite bliss in heaven cannot be a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue. If this is correct, then no one deserves to go to heaven.<br />
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What do you make of Arguments I and II? Are they sound?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com16tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-13507873527094292072015-04-21T16:39:00.001-04:002015-04-21T16:39:51.144-04:00[PHI 3000] The God hypothesisIn "<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/testing-the-god-hypothesi_b_4226750.html" target="_blank">Testing the God Hypothesis</a>," the physicist Victor Stenger, claims that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically, in the same way that scientific hypotheses are tested. According to Stenger, any of the following, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis:<br />
<ul>
<li><b>Afterlife</b>: "a person who had been declared dead by every means known to science might return to life with detailed stories of an afterlife that were later verified. For example, she might meet Jimmy Hoffa who tells her where to find his body."</li>
<li><b>Miracles</b>: "Miracles are observed. For example, prayers are answered; an arm or a leg is regenerated through faith healing."</li>
<li><b>Revelation</b>: "any claim of a revelation obtained during a mystical trance could contain scientifically verifiable information that the subject could not possibly have known."</li>
<li><b>Moral law</b>: "Natural events might follow some moral law, rather than morally neutral mathematical laws. For example, lightning might strike only the wicked; people who behave badly might fall sick more often; nuns would always survive plane crashes."</li>
</ul>
If any of these were observed, Stenger argues, they would count as empirical evidence in favor of the God hypothesis.<br />
<br />
Do you agree with Stenger that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically? If so, what else, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis?<br />
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If, after several tests, no empirical evidence is forthcoming, what should we conclude: that <i>the God hypothesis is probably false</i> or that <i>the existence of God cannot be tested empirically</i>?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-50912375704223669462015-04-07T23:58:00.000-04:002015-04-07T23:58:49.940-04:00[PHI 3630] Rumor has itIn <a href="http://books.google.com/books/about/What_to_Believe_Now.html?id=Q-ymio7eqVoC" target="_blank"><i>What To Believe Now</i></a>, Coady argues that the survival of a rumor (i.e., a communication that has spread through a large number of informants) is evidence for its veracity. As Coady puts it:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
the "distance" of rumors from an original eyewitness account does not constitute a general reason for skepticism about their veracity. On the contrary, such distance may make belief in rumors more warranted (p. 96).</blockquote>
Now, imagine that you are a young Egyptian in January 2011. You hear rumors about a massive demonstration that is about to take place.<br />
<br />
<br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="281" mozallowfullscreen="" src="https://player.vimeo.com/video/45410957" webkitallowfullscreen="" width="500"></iframe> <br />
<a href="https://vimeo.com/45410957">How Facebook Changed the World – the story of the Arab Spring. episode 1</a> from <a href="https://vimeo.com/user2933260">Sam Farmar</a> on <a href="https://vimeo.com/">Vimeo</a>.<br />
<br />
On the other hand, you also receive the following text message:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Youth of Egypt, beware rumors and listen to the sound of reason - Egypt is above all so preserve it</i>.</blockquote>
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From an <i>epistemic </i>point of view, what should you believe?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-72588094805615675382015-03-31T20:45:00.002-04:002015-03-31T20:45:51.885-04:00[PHI 3000] Love ThyselfThe Western conception of God is that of an all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and morally perfect creator. <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts-god/#Imp" target="_blank">Love</a> is often said to be an essential part of this conception of God.<br />
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In the Old and New Testament, God issues the following commands that have to do with love:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<a href="http://biblehub.com/deuteronomy/6-5.htm" target="_blank"><i>you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might</i></a>. </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<a href="http://biblehub.com/mark/12-31.htm" target="_blank"><i>you shall love your neighbor as yourself</i></a>.</blockquote>
If God wants us to love him and each other, which is consistent with the Western conception of God as a morally perfect being, it is rather puzzling that there are people who are incapable of loving others.<br />
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Why would God command us to love him and each other and then make some people (e.g., <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/narcissism" target="_blank">narcissists</a>, <a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/psychopathy" target="_blank">psychopaths</a>, etc.) incapable of obeying these commands? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com13tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-34828393169996476842015-03-17T23:18:00.005-04:002015-03-17T23:19:51.076-04:00[PHI 3630] Are all opinions equal?In "<a href="http://wpo.st/bsF90" target="_blank">The science of protecting people's feelings: why we pretend all opinions are equal</a>," Chris Mooney discusses a study which shows that participants "weight each other's opinion equally regardless of differences in their reliability, even when this strategy was at odds with explicit feedback or monetary incentives."<br />
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Here is the abstract of the paper, which was published in <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/03/05/1421692112.abstract" target="_blank"><i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</i></a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
We tend to think that everyone deserves an equal say in a debate. This seemingly innocuous assumption can be damaging when we make decisions together as part of a group. To make optimal decisions, group members should weight their differing opinions according to how competent they are relative to one another; whenever they differ in competence, an equal weighting is suboptimal. Here, we asked how people deal with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task. We developed a metric for estimating how participants weight their partner’s opinion relative to their own and compared this weighting to an optimal benchmark. Replicated across three countries (Denmark, Iran, and China), we show that <i>participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other’s opinions regardless of true differences in their competence—even when informed by explicit feedback about their competence gap or under monetary incentives to maximize collective accuracy</i>. This equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good or as bad as their partner, is particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members.</blockquote>
Mooney goes further than what the authors of the study say and claims that the study "underscores this conclusion — that we need to recognize experts more, respect them, and listen to them." Do the results of the study actually support this conclusion? If so, how? If not, why not? <br />
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-48495995569714093392015-02-13T23:03:00.000-05:002015-02-13T23:03:20.889-05:00[PHI 3630] Enjoy your achievements...In "<a href="http://commonweb.unifr.ch/artsdean/pub/gestens/f/as/files/4610/32943_103625.pdf" target="_blank">The Value Problem</a>," John Greco advances the following argument as a solution to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/" target="_blank">the value problem</a> (why is knowledge valuable?):<br />
<ol>
<li>Achievements are finally valuable.</li>
<li>Knowledge is a kind of achievement.</li>
<li>Therefore, knowledge is finally valuable.</li>
</ol>
This argument is valid. If it is sound, then knowledge has intrinsic value (i.e., valuable for its own sake), not merely instrumental value (i.e., valuable as a means to an end). Is this argument sound?<br />
<br />
Greco considers mostly objections against premise (2). But what about premise (1)? Is it the case that achievements have intrinsic value? Or are they valuable as means to an end? Consider the view known as psychological or <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/#PsyHed" target="_blank">motivational hedonism</a>. According to this view, we humans are motivated by pleasure or displeasure. If something like motivational hedonism is correct, would it follow that achievements are valuable only insofar as they give us pleasure or satisfaction? If so, does that mean that achievements are not valuable for their own sake after all? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-83600333765037382532015-01-11T13:33:00.000-05:002015-01-11T13:33:36.290-05:00[PHI 2200] Was Kant a hypocrite?<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/" target="_blank">Immanuel Kant</a> is one of the dominant figures in the history of philosophy, particularly moral philosophy. Kant's ethics, also known as <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#DeoTheKan" target="_blank">deontological ethics</a>, is one of the three main theoretical approaches to normative ethics to this day (<a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/#H2" target="_blank">deontology, consequentialism, and virtue theory</a>).<br />
<br />
At the core of Kant’s moral philosophy is the notion of human dignity. As <a href="http://thinkjustdoit.blogspot.com/2012/04/pl-431-kants-formulations-of.html" target="_blank">the second formula of the Categorical Imperative</a> (AKA, the Humanity Formula) states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." Human beings must be treated as ends, not as means to an end, because they are rational agents. The source of our dignity and worth, according to Kant, is the fact that we are free rational agents who are the legislators of our own moral laws.<br />
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Unfortunately, it appears that <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=065yiKuR7O0C&lpg=PA98&dq=kant%20%22white%20race%22&pg=PA99#v=onepage&q&f=false" target="_blank">Kant himself was a racist</a>.<br />
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If Kant didn't think that all human beings are equal in dignity, does that mean that he was a <a href="http://thinkjustdoit.blogspot.com/2012/03/pl-211-experts-and-hypocricy.html" target="_blank">hypocrite</a>? If Kant was indeed a racist, does that undermine his notion of human dignity? Should we dismiss his moral philosophy because he could not live up to his own standards? [Similar questions can be raised about <a href="http://nyti.ms/19TK3DJ" target="_blank">David Hume</a>.]Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-59540702939004255832015-01-11T13:21:00.002-05:002015-01-11T13:21:44.202-05:00[PHI 2200] Do we have an obligation to resist oppression?According to <a href="http://nyti.ms/19xXpVZ" target="_blank">Carol Hay</a>, we can say what makes sexual harassment morally wrong by appealing to <a href="http://thinkjustdoit.blogspot.com/2012/04/pl-431-kants-formulations-of.html" target="_blank">Kant's ethical theory</a>, in particular, to what Kant says about our duty to respect the dignity of others and our own, given that we are rational beings. As Hay writes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Because we have an obligation to prevent harms to our rational nature, and because oppression can harm our capacity to act rationally, we have an obligation to resist our own oppression. Despite what Kant himself might've thought, we know that women's rational capacities are no different from men's. Thus we can use Kantianism to explain why women are just as deserving of respect as men and why this respect is incompatible with sexist oppression.</blockquote>
Her argument can be reconstructed as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>We have an obligation to resist attempts to hinder our capacity to act rationally.</li>
<li>Sexual harassment (sexist oppression) is an attempt to hinder women's capacity to act rationally.</li>
<li>Therefore, women have an obligation to resist sexist oppression.</li>
</ol>
Do you think that Hay's argument can be extended to other forms of oppression as well?<br />
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For example, could one argue from Hay's premises that the poor have an obligation to resist <a href="http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/half-the-sky/economic-empowerment/" target="_blank">economic oppression</a>? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-40669761133575164252014-12-04T12:33:00.002-05:002014-12-07T09:07:29.922-05:00[PHI 3000] The Principle of Credulity and the Schizophrenic MastersIn <i><a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=qL-GWmeSXCQC&lpg=PA310&ots=R9b6cjdtI-&dq=the%20occurrence%20of%20religious%20experiences%20is%20prima%20facie%20reason%20for%20all%20to%20believe%20in%20that%20of%20which%20the%20reported%20experience%20was%20purportedly%20an%20experience&pg=PA310#v=onepage&q&f=false" target="_blank">The Existence of God</a></i>, Richard Swinburne writes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
if it seems to me that I have a glimpse of Heaven, or a vision of God, that is grounds for me and others to suppose that I do. And, more generally, the occurrence of religious experiences is <i>prima facie</i> reason for all to believe in that of which the reported experience was purportedly an experience (Swinburne 2004, 310).</blockquote>
Swinburne’s argument is a version of an argument for the existence of God known as the argument from <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-experience/" target="_blank">religious experience</a>. Swinburne’s version of the argument is based on a principle he calls the Principle of Credulity. According to the Principle of Credulity, "if it seems (epistemically) to <i>S</i> that <i>x</i> is present, that is good reason for <i>S</i> to believe that <i>x</i> is present" (Swinburne 2004, 310). Swinburne says that the Principle of Credulity is "a principle of rationality," that "what one seems to perceive is probably so" (Swinburne 2004, 303).<br />
<br />
Using the Principle of Credulity, then, Swinburne argues roughly as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>If it seems (epistemically) to me (Swinburne) that God is present, that is good reason for me to believe that God is present.</li>
<li>It seems (epistemically) to me that God is present.</li>
<li>Therefore, I (Swinburne) have good reason to believe that God is present.</li>
</ol>
Now, in 1907, the German artist, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Natterer" target="_blank">August Natterer</a>, had an experience which he later described as follows:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
I saw a white spot in the clouds absolutely close – all the clouds paused – then the white spot departed and stood all the time like a board in the sky. On the same board or the screen or stage now images as quick as a flash followed each other, about 10,000 in half an hour… God himself occurred, the witch, who created the world – in between worldly visions: images of war, continents, memorials, castles, beautiful castles, just the glory of the world – but all of this to see in supernal images. They were at least twenty meters big, clear to observe, almost without color like photographs… The images were epiphanies of the Last Judgment. Christ couldn't fulfill the salvation because he was crucified early... God revealed them to me to accomplish the salvation.</blockquote>
Based on his experience, is it rational for Natterer to conclude that God is present?<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2PLc-VQcqUpihMnempiogXwiAk4aj84VXCWsei8jCGPzHfR9_3BWanUnDQ3QD3I48EHYWhsdGFe4ZGDV7eWUhJKqIRqf-yTokZAwkxcBS_pXNReUUTs6HAklaQm5fZ7eA8K0sDeuT0wb8/s1600/August_Natterer.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2PLc-VQcqUpihMnempiogXwiAk4aj84VXCWsei8jCGPzHfR9_3BWanUnDQ3QD3I48EHYWhsdGFe4ZGDV7eWUhJKqIRqf-yTokZAwkxcBS_pXNReUUTs6HAklaQm5fZ7eA8K0sDeuT0wb8/s1600/August_Natterer.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Hexenkopf</i> (<i>The Witch's Head</i>), ca. 1915</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
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If Natterer's experience does not give him (and us) a good reason to believe that God is present, does that mean that the Principle of Credulity is false?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-51446943760533957112014-11-24T12:20:00.000-05:002014-11-24T12:20:40.537-05:00[PHI 2200] Can excessive wealth and inequality be justified?According to <a href="http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2013-01-19/annual-income-richest-100-people-enough-end-global-poverty-four" target="_blank">Oxfam</a>, "<a href="http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/cost-of-inequality-oxfam-mb180113.pdf" target="_blank">Extreme Wealth and Inequality is unethical</a>."<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Gandhi famously said "Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed." From an ethical point of view, it is extremely difficult to justify excessive wealth and inequality. In fact, most philosophers and all of the major religions caution against the pursuit of excessive wealth at all cost and prescribe sharing of income with less fortunate members of the community. For instance, the Koran bans usury and says that the rich should give away a portion of their money. The decision of Bill Gates and Warren Buffet to give away their fortunes or to call for greater taxation of excess wealth is an example to the rest of the world's billionaires.</blockquote>
Is there a moral justification for excessive wealth and inequality?<br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/cgGP3zV8kdU?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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<br />
Are billionaires, like Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and other rich and famous people (see <a href="http://youtu.be/cgGP3zV8kdU" target="_blank">YouTube video</a>), doing enough to alleviate the suffering of poor people or should they do more?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com25tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-744209025098622692014-11-24T10:19:00.001-05:002014-11-24T10:23:23.104-05:00[PHI 1000] Mental health and moral responsibilityAccording to a report issued by a Connecticut state agency:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/21/justice/newtown-shooter-adam-lanza-report/index.html" target="_blank">Newtown shooter Adam Lanza was an isolated young man with deteriorating mental health and a fascination for mass violence whose problems were not ignored but misunderstood and mistreated</a>.</blockquote>
The report says that Lanza's mental health problems included "autism, anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and suicidal disorder." The report also says that his mother made his condition worse by refusing medical treatment, keeping him at home, and not restricting his access to guns.<br />
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<iframe frameborder="0" height="234" src="http://www.cnn.com/video/api/embed.html#/video/crime/2014/11/22/nr-vo-valencia-adam-lanza-report.cnn" width="416"></iframe>
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<br />
All of the above notwithstanding, the report concludes that "In the end, only [Lanza], and [Lanza] alone, bears <i>responsibility</i> for this monstrous act." But why? Why think that Lanza is <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/" target="_blank">responsible</a> (i.e., that he is worthy of blame or that he deserves punishment) for the shooting despite the numerous mental health problems he suffered from?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-18944405365799512642014-11-18T13:16:00.000-05:002014-11-18T13:17:16.105-05:00[PHI 1000] Free Will, fragile lives, and shattered dreamsSome claim that <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/" target="_blank">free will</a> is an illusion. What is usually meant by that is that the <i>feeling</i> of being able to act freely or to freely decide what to do is just that--a feeling. In other words, we <i>feel</i> free but we are not <i>really</i> free. For example, the psychologist John Bargh writes: "<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=_t4k_r7-2jgC&lpg=PA148&dq=The%20phenomenological%20feeling%20of%20free%20will%20is%20very%20real&pg=PA148#v=onepage&q&f=false" target="_blank">The phenomenological feeling of free will is very real … but this strong feeling is an illusion</a>" (2008, p. 148).<br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/VrZ4sMRYimw?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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Is this feeling of control or "<a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=TvvaM77QC44C&lpg=PA7&dq=up-to-me-ness&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false" target="_blank">up-to-me-ness</a>" (Caruso 2012, p. 188) a feeling that most (maybe even all) people share? If it is, should we expect most people to feel that they are in control of their lives?<br />
<br />
Suppose we find out that most people feel that their lives are fragile (see <a href="http://youtu.be/VrZ4sMRYimw" target="_blank">YouTube video</a>), would the following argument be sound?<br />
<ol>
<li>If people feel that they are in control, then they will not feel that their lives are fragile.</li>
<li>People do feel that their lives are fragile.</li>
<li>Therefore, it is not the case that people feel that they are in control.</li>
</ol>
Suppose we find out that most people feel that their dreams have been shattered (see <a href="http://youtu.be/VrZ4sMRYimw" target="_blank">YouTube video</a>), would the following argument be sound?<br />
<ol>
<li>If free will were real, then people would not feel that their dreams have been shattered.</li>
<li>People do feel that their dreams have been shattered.</li>
<li>Therefore, free will is not real.</li>
</ol>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-25028173320860140992014-10-31T13:30:00.000-04:002014-10-31T13:30:12.558-04:00[PHI 1000] The SwitchIn this episode of <a href="http://youtu.be/IxGQ813G6g0" target="_blank">Tales from the Crypt</a>, Carlton undergoes a gradual transformation at the end of which his old body is replaced with the body of a young man.<br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/IxGQ813G6g0?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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At the end of the switch, is Carlton still Carlton?<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEin60aLfjtQd5A8HtFY5VJyvQAZqksG0mL4z-ntPSvxJq5ur2lvw6imrL1Umdtmbv-_f1QqspNoq5dCsC5kIyfNhLq13QEenEa3q7DwFu1RHA0L15JbNiX2pfiq6T5fplT1WxyVMLnJJY5X/s1600/switch.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEin60aLfjtQd5A8HtFY5VJyvQAZqksG0mL4z-ntPSvxJq5ur2lvw6imrL1Umdtmbv-_f1QqspNoq5dCsC5kIyfNhLq13QEenEa3q7DwFu1RHA0L15JbNiX2pfiq6T5fplT1WxyVMLnJJY5X/s1600/switch.png" height="343" width="400" /></a></div>
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And who is Carlton: the one with the old body or the one with the young body?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-34831465544527148742014-10-27T13:31:00.002-04:002014-10-27T13:31:29.149-04:00[PHI 2200] Do animals have a moral sense?According to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/#ForArg" target="_blank">Metaethical Moral Relativism</a> (MMR):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.</blockquote>
Now, experiments, like those showcased in this NOVA Science Now episode on <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/animal-morality.html" target="_blank">Animal Morality</a>, show that animals display moral and altruistic (selfless) behavior, such as sharing with others, helping strangers, and the like.<br />
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If these experiments really do show that animals have a (rudimentary) moral sense of right and wrong (e.g., a sense of fairness), would that undermine the thesis that there are no absolute or universal moral truths?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-47356275748589618862014-10-24T13:04:00.002-04:002014-10-24T13:04:09.057-04:00[PHI 2200] Sacrificing one for the good of manyHere are the results of the surveys we conducted in class today using <a href="http://www.socrative.com/" target="_blank">Socrative</a>:<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2NJCUlYou8Moz11Df35_ynX0MA4mLLLdR3bt5r7WjIq6hGbVUQbpExWjVWs70FaTpz6MJ6E0KVw2nPHi0hIjdQuPuxbtthI1Hpy6nfx3O12EWKb2Vj89x69L26zaB74v4h4fDTAlKZ_0v/s1600/phi2200.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj2NJCUlYou8Moz11Df35_ynX0MA4mLLLdR3bt5r7WjIq6hGbVUQbpExWjVWs70FaTpz6MJ6E0KVw2nPHi0hIjdQuPuxbtthI1Hpy6nfx3O12EWKb2Vj89x69L26zaB74v4h4fDTAlKZ_0v/s1600/phi2200.png" height="238" width="400" /></a></div>
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<br />
One interesting thing to note about these results is that in both the Riots case (should you bear false witness against an innocent person to stop the riots?) and the Firing Squad case (should you shoot one person to spare the lives of the other four?) the utilitarian idea is <b><i>sacrifice one to save many</i></b>. But judgments about what one should do in these cases vary from 29/30 (97%) for "<i>shouldn't bear false witness to stop the riots</i>" to only 15/30 (50%) for "<i>shouldn't shoot one to save four</i>." Why is that?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-47016836751111711662014-10-22T10:33:00.003-04:002014-10-22T10:33:52.917-04:00[PHI 1000] Is phenomenal consciousness illusory?In <a href="http://philosophybites.com/2014/10/keith-frankish-on-the-hard-problem-and-the-illusion-of-qualia.html" target="_blank">this Philosophy Bites podcast</a>, Keith <a href="http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/7/2/0/720e7067f1cce8c1/Keith_Frankish_on_the_Hard_Problem_and_the_Illusion_of_Qualia.mp3?c_id=7730552&expiration=1413989394&hwt=9d3bd39af7649fa561ed66e78dd20120" target="_blank">Frankish claims that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion</a>.<br />
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More precisely, he claims that what philosophers call "<a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/" target="_blank">qualia</a>" (AKA the "subjective character of experience," the "what it is like," or "phenomenal properties") is an illusion. It is an illusion, <a href="http://hwcdn.libsyn.com/p/7/2/0/720e7067f1cce8c1/Keith_Frankish_on_the_Hard_Problem_and_the_Illusion_of_Qualia.mp3?c_id=7730552&expiration=1413989394&hwt=9d3bd39af7649fa561ed66e78dd20120" target="_blank">according to Frankish</a>, insofar as qualia or phenomenal properties merely seem to be non-physical but are not really non-physical.<br />
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<iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/jTWmTJALe1w?feature=player_embedded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div>
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What is Frankish's argument for the claim that qualia are illusory? Is it a good argument? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-21267796941789715562014-10-17T17:44:00.005-04:002014-10-17T17:44:53.854-04:00[PHI 1000] Smartest Machine on EarthIf the mental (or mind) and the physical (or the body/brain) <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/" target="_blank">"are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing</a>," as dualism says, and what characterizes creatures that have a mind is the ability to think, then we should expect that purely physical things, like machines, would not be able to think.<br />
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Now, meet <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/tech/smartest-machine-on-earth.html" target="_blank">Watson</a>.<br />
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<iframe frameborder="0" height="376" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" seamless="" src="http://video.pbs.org/viralplayer/1786674622" width="512"></iframe>
Watson is able to answer Jeopardy questions by <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/" target="_blank">testing hypotheses</a>. If that counts as thinking, then the following argument against mind-body dualism can be made:<br />
<ol>
<li>If the mental (mind) and the physical (body) are radically different kinds of thing, then machines cannot think.</li>
<li>Machines can think (e.g., Watson).</li>
<li>Therefore, it is not the case that the mental (mind) and the physical (body) are radically different kinds of thing.</li>
</ol>
Is this argument sound?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com15tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-39367832901359516372014-10-01T09:53:00.000-04:002014-10-01T09:53:18.826-04:00[PHI 1000] "I could read it but I don't believe it"Some members of the <a href="http://science.house.gov/" target="_blank">House of Representatives' Committee on Science, Space, and Technology</a> appear to mistrust scientists and what they say about climate change, as seen in <a href="http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/8q3nmm/burn-noticed" target="_blank">this clip from The Daily Show</a>.<br />
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<iframe frameborder="0" height="288" src="http://media.mtvnservices.com/embed/mgid:arc:video:thedailyshow.com:74a66229-cdca-41a4-a4de-0911279a8d9d" width="512"></iframe><br />
<div style="background-color: white; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-top: 4px; padding: 4px; text-align: left;">
<b><a href="http://thedailyshow.cc.com/">The Daily Show</a></b><br />Get More: <a href="http://thedailyshow.cc.com/full-episodes/">Daily Show Full Episodes</a>,<a href="http://www.facebook.com/thedailyshow">The Daily Show on Facebook</a>,<a href="http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos">Daily Show Video Archive</a></div>
</div>
</div>
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For example, Rep. Larry Bucshon says the following:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>All the climatologists whose careers depend on the climate changing to keep themselves publishing articles ... I could read [the scientific literature on climate change] but I don't believe it</i>.</blockquote>
Is this a good reason to mistrust what scientists say about climate change? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-60047199957785586832014-09-15T14:13:00.000-04:002014-09-15T14:14:21.217-04:00[PHI 2200] The morality of the ice bucket challengeDo you think that those who participate in the <a href="http://www.alsa.org/fight-als/ice-bucket-challenge.html" target="_blank">Ice Bucket Challenge</a> are doing something morally good? That is, those who pour buckets of ice water on themselves for <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amyotrophic_lateral_sclerosis" target="_blank">ALS</a> should be praised for doing so. After all, in so doing, they are trying to support the fight against ALS.<br />
<br />
If so, consider the following facts:<br />
<br />
(1) <b>Lots of water has been wasted for the ALS cause</b>. <a href="http://lbpost.com/news/2000004218-ice-bucket-challenge" target="_blank">Jason Ruiz</a> writes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"To put the waste this campaign has caused into simple terms, let’s just assume everyone is using a five gallon bucket. Now multiply that number by the more than 1.2 million videos shared on Facebook since June 1. Based on that assumption (5 x 1,200,000), over 6 million gallons of water have been poured out in the name of Lou Gehrig’s Disease. The average American household uses 320 gallons per day, which means that based on this estimation, nearly 19,000 homes’ daily water usage has been wasted. And that’s not even taking into account that videos posted online often depict multiple people, sometimes even entire sororities or fraternities, taking part in the ice bucket challenge, often using more than one bucket per video." </blockquote>
(2) <b>Water scarcity is a global crisis</b>. According to the <a href="http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml" target="_blank">UN</a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Around 700 million people in 43 countries suffer today from water scarcity. By 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the world's population could be living under water stressed conditions. With the existing climate change scenario, almost half the world's population will be living in areas of high water stress by 2030, including between 75 million and 250 million people in Africa. In addition, water scarcity in some arid and semi-arid places will displace between 24 million and 700 million people. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of water-stressed countries of any region."</blockquote>
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In fact, it is estimated that "<a href="http://guardianlv.com/2014/08/als-ice-bucket-challenge-matt-damon-adds-dirty-new-twist/" target="_blank">every 21 seconds a child dies from a water-related illness</a>."<br />
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Do you think that these facts put the morality of the Ice Bucket Challenge into question? If so, why? If not, why not? Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-19468232534150822802014-09-07T10:42:00.000-04:002014-09-07T10:42:44.541-04:00[PHI 1000] Is philosophy about questions?The results of our (HON1010C Philosophy of the Human Person) word association game are in:<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFC6833OUoJmDCVdIFyoDHqCXLSuVtDs03iX_O57FMA14QBalpQVLJI1JRTY2frR9Q15qEAGkzNmieHfS1K4F5cold8hKfo0KDnAzYX9rdoY6vuB_LC9S-buYKo20MKzbCMKJLQx5ipJlw/s1600/HON1010CF14.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjFC6833OUoJmDCVdIFyoDHqCXLSuVtDs03iX_O57FMA14QBalpQVLJI1JRTY2frR9Q15qEAGkzNmieHfS1K4F5cold8hKfo0KDnAzYX9rdoY6vuB_LC9S-buYKo20MKzbCMKJLQx5ipJlw/s1600/HON1010CF14.png" height="238" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tag_cloud" target="_blank">Size of word indicates prominence</a>.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<br />
Are these results consistent with Russell's claim that "<a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm#link2HCH0015" target="_blank">Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves</a>"? If so, why? If not, why not? <br />
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-61922428985091888602014-04-25T23:06:00.000-04:002014-04-25T23:06:16.763-04:00[PHI 2200] On playing the 'Playing God' cardIn <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/suicidetourist/" target="_blank"><i>The Suicide Tourist</i></a>, Craig Ewert makes the following comment:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
There are people who will look at this and say, "No, suicide is wrong. God has forbidden it. You cannot play God and take your own life." Well, all right, fine. But you know what? This ventilator is playing God. If I had lived without access to technology, chances are I would be dead now, all right? When premature babies are born, they are given intensive medical treatment. Their lives are saved because doctors and nurses are playing God. They're saying, essentially, "God's plan was that this person would die right now. We're thwarting that. We're playing God."</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
And you know, they never say, "We have to stop organ transplants. We have to stop saving premature babies. We have to let them die." Oh, no. For that, it's OK to play God. It's only when it might ease somebody's suffering that, "Oh, we can't play God" comes out.</blockquote>
Ewert's comment can be construed as an argument as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>If it is morally impermissible to "play God" in order to ease the suffering of a terminal patient, then it is morally impermissible to "play God" in order to save a premature baby.</li>
<li>It is morally permissible to "play God" in order to save the life of a premature baby.</li>
<li>Therefore, it is morally permissible to "play God" in order to ease the suffering of a terminal patient. </li>
</ol>
What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?<br />
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Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-89983455512042565822014-04-17T23:20:00.000-04:002014-04-17T23:20:50.615-04:00[PHI 3000] The Punishment TheodicyA theodicy is an account that is supposed to show why God is justified in allowing <a href="http://thinkjustdoit.blogspot.com/2012/04/phi-3000-good-and-evil.html" target="_blank">evil</a> in this world. One such account is known as “<a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H6" target="_blank">the punishment theodicy</a>.” According to the punishment theodicy, God allows natural evil (i.e., the pain, suffering, death, and destruction that result from natural processes, such as earthquakes, storms, and the like) as punishment for sin.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivSn-xen9J_vJgIA68gdpqmJLlCWA1nGTf2CijGL49yN3f7kwHYfG779jMQdlnmVtUGrIpoPV6qaJ93LU7X1k_dAOIwjaP3dtrmdz0wbwDlMABQRC8WyQnyKpi3dEs3mB61aeK3-imgCQp/s1600/punish.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivSn-xen9J_vJgIA68gdpqmJLlCWA1nGTf2CijGL49yN3f7kwHYfG779jMQdlnmVtUGrIpoPV6qaJ93LU7X1k_dAOIwjaP3dtrmdz0wbwDlMABQRC8WyQnyKpi3dEs3mB61aeK3-imgCQp/s1600/punish.png" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Pereboom, 2005, "The Problem of Evil," <i>The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion</i>, p. 155.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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Now, consider the fact that studies have shown that <a href="http://www.cccf-fcsge.ca/wp-content/uploads/RS_82-e.pdf" target="_blank">physical punishment is not effective</a> and is actually <a href="http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/04/spanking.aspx" target="_blank">harmful to kids</a>. In light of these studies, and given that natural evil is a form of physical punishment (i.e., an action intended to cause physical discomfort or pain to correct behavior), it follows that God is allowing a discipline method that is not only ineffective but also harmful to us. That is:<br />
<ol>
<li>Natural evil is physical punishment from God. [the punishment theodicy]</li>
<li>Physical punishment is an ineffective and harmful discipline method.</li>
<li>Therefore, God is allowing us to be disciplined in an ineffective and harmful way.</li>
</ol>
This conclusion, namely, (3), seems to be incompatible with the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts-god/" target="_blank">concept of God</a> as an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent being. Being all-powerful and all-knowing, God could surely come up with effective and harmless ways to discipline us, if he wanted to. Being benevolent, he would want to do just that. And yet, if the punishment theodicy is true, we are being punished by God in ineffective and harmful ways. Does this mean that the punishment theodicy must be false?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8443579046890135037.post-79822582143231397212014-04-16T23:00:00.003-04:002014-04-16T23:00:29.758-04:00[PHI 3800] Looks can be deceivingAccording to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/" target="_blank">Constructive E<span id="goog_1983124911"></span><span id="goog_1983124912"></span>mpiricism</a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
science aims at truth about observable aspects of the world, but that science does not aim at truth about unobservable aspects. Acceptance of a theory, according to constructive empiricism, correspondingly differs from acceptance of a theory on the scientific realist view: the constructive empiricist holds that as far as belief is concerned, acceptance of a scientific theory involves only the belief that the theory is empirically adequate.</blockquote>
According to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constructive-empiricism/#1.6" target="_blank">van Fraassen</a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>X</i> is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if <i>X</i> is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it.</blockquote>
For the constructive empiricist, then, microscopic objects and processes that are too small for us to see with the naked eye, such as cells and intracellular process, are unobservable.<br />
<br />
Now, instead of the too small, consider the <a href="http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/imax-and-3d/mysteries-of-the-unseen-world" target="_blank">too slow</a>. We cannot observe with the naked eye the growth of plants, for example, not because plants are too small, but because plant growth is a process that occurs too slowly for us to notice. To observe the growth of plants, we need to use technology. In particular, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-lapse_photography" target="_blank">time-lapse photography</a> allows us to capture processes that occur too slowly for us to observe with the naked eye.<br />
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For the constructive empiricist, then, are slow processes that we cannot observe with the naked eye unobservable?<br />
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Similarly, consider the <a href="http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/imax-and-3d/mysteries-of-the-unseen-world" target="_blank">too fast</a>. We cannot observe with the naked eye the bouncing of raindrops off puddles, for example, not because raindrops are too small, but because this is a process that occurs too fast for us to notice. To observe the bouncing of raindrops off puddles, we need to use technology. In particular, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-speed_photography" target="_blank">high-speed photography</a> allows us to capture processes that occur too fast for us to observe with the naked eye.<br />
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For the constructive empiricist, then, are fast processes that we cannot observe with the naked eye unobservable?Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06442978444189475572noreply@blogger.com0