[PHI 3000] Is much of philosophy not really philosophy?

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to rationalize is to "attempt to explain or justify (behavior or an attitude) with logical reasons, even if these are not appropriate." Rationalizing, in this pejorative sense, is more like making excuses and is usually done after the fact. For example, after I eat chocolate, I might rationalize my action (i.e., make an excuse) by saying that chocolate has antioxidants. But that is not why I ate chocolate in the first place. To put the same point in terms of beliefs, rather than actions, we could say that to rationalize is to find excuses for our beliefs.

Unlike rationalizing, reasoning (i.e., to reason) is drawing conclusions from evidence or reasons. To put the point in terms of beliefs, we could say that to reason is to find beliefs that are worthy of acceptance.

The red arrow depicts rationalization, whereas the green arrow depicts reasoning.

Now, it seems that, at times, philosophy has been more about rationalizing than reasoning. Here are just a few examples:

• Philosophy of religion: Starting with the belief that God exists and trying to find reasons (or excuses) for this belief.
• Metaphysics: Starting with the belief that human beings have free will and trying to find reasons (or excuses) for this belief.
• Epistemology: Starting with the belief that we know certain facts and trying to find an analysis of knowledge that accommodates this belief.
• Philosophy of Science: Starting with the belief that science is a rational enterprise and trying to find a philosophy of science that accommodates this belief.
• Ethics: Starting with the belief that we are obligated to do only what we can do and trying to find a moral theory that accommodates this belief.

Are these fair characterizations of these philosophical projects? If so, is this a problem?

[PHI 3000] Does the method of cases rest on a mistake?

In light of the excellent feedback I received from readers of the Experimental Philosophy blog, I think there are actually two analogical arguments that can be made with respect to the method of cases (i.e., the method of appealing to intuitive judgments elicited by thought experiments).

Analogy 1: perceptual judgments : artificial perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : negative thought experiments

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by artificial perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted image.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted scenario.
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.

By "negative thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that are deliberately designed to refute a given theory by showing that it is at odds with the intuitive judgments that the thought experiments are supposed to elicit. For instance, Jackson's thought experiment about Mary is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that Mary learned something new upon seeing red, and this intuition is then used as evidence against physicalism.

This sort of negative thought experiment is analogous to artificial perceptual illusions, such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, which are deliberately designed to trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that line (a) is longer than line (b).

Muller-Lyer Illusion

Analogy 2:  perceptual judgments : natural perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : positive thought experiments

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by natural perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a distorted image.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are elicited by unusual situation that present to the subject a distorted scenario (albeit not deliberately).
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.

By "positive thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that seek to elicit certain intuitive judgments as support for a theory. For instance, Thomson's thought experiment about the violinist is not used to refute a particular theory, but rather to explore the moral permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances. The thought experiment is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that one is not morally obligated to remain attached to the violinist, and so, by analogy, that abortion is morally permissible even if a fetus has a right to life.

This sort of positive thought experiment is analogous to natural perceptual illusions, such as a mirage, which are naturally occurring optical phenomena that can (albeit not deliberately) trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that the road is wet.

Hot-Road (Fake Water) Mirage

What do you think about these analogical arguments?

[PHI 3000] Does philosophical method rest on a mistake?

[cross-posted on Experimental Philosophy]

Consider the following analogy: 

perceptual judgments : perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : intuition pumps

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because they are typically elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps are typically elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps are unlikely to be correct.

The way I see this analogy is the following:

Square A seems darker than square B.
http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html

Pushing the fat man off the bridge seems wrong.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/10foot.html

Just as perceptual judgments elicited by perceptual illusions, such as the checkerboard illusion, are unlikely to be correct, intuitive judgments elicited from thought-experiments, such as the Trolley Problem, are unlikely to be correct, since both perceptual illusions and intuition pumps are elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.

What do you make of this argument?

[PHI 3000] So what if we don't know what we think we know?

It is often said that an analysis of knowledge that entails that we do not know anything except the truths of mathematics and logic must be wrong. But why?

In other words, many accept something like the following argument:

1. According to a Cartesian analysis of knowledge, S knows that p only if p is absolutely certain.
2. But few propositions can be known with absolute certainty.
3. Therefore, a Cartesian analysis of knowledge must be incorrect.

But why should we accept this argument? So what if it turns out that we don't really know many of the things we think we know?