[PL 211] Do/should we depend on others epistemically?

Following up on my last post about the (alleged) myth of the independent rational thinker, it is often said that social epistemology has demonstrated that we are epistemically dependent on others (e.g., see here and here).

After quoting Johnson and Blair on this point, Goodwin (2011, p. 287) writes:

we are dependent on others for much of what we know, since we don't have the time to investigate everything for ourselves, and many things are accessible only through the testimony of others.

From the fact that we sometimes reason by relying on other people's testimony and/or opinions, does it follow that this is how we ought to reason?

Goodwin (2011, p. 287) goes on to write:

philosophers have therefore shifted the appeal to authority out of the category of fallacy and accepted it instead as a potentially sound form of argument.

Even if we are dependent on the testimony of others, such as experts, does it follow that the appeal to authority is a sound form of argument?

Is this a sound argument?

Is this a cogent argument?

[PL 211] Is the independent rational person a myth?

In Logical Self-Defense, Johnson and Blair (1994, pp. 167-168) write:

it would be a mistake to picture the autonomous self-guiding, belief-scrutinizing individual as a person who sets off completely independently, an isolated rational agent building up a system of beliefs by carefully checking and confirming each "belief" candidate before adding it to the store of trusted claims or discarding it as unverified or false. For one thing, the very classification and testing systems such a person would have to use would themselves at some point just have to be accepted, at least for the time being; otherwise there would be an infinite regress of testing tests and testing concepts. For another, it is simply physically and mentally impossible for one person to verify everything. No single individual can have the time or the intelligence to do the job.

Do you agree with Johnson and Blair?

There seem to be a few points here that need further clarification:

• Why is it that being an independent rational agent has to mean that one has to confirm each belief candidate independently? As a scientist, for example, I don't have to replicate every single experiment. I can rely on experimental results reported in professional journal. Of course, I still read the articles carefully to make sure that the methodology is not flawed and that the reported conclusions are well-supported. Am I not being a rational agent in doing so? In other words, why does the choice have to be between believing only your own eyes, so to speak, and relying on others? Isn't that a false choice?
• I can accept a method for testing beliefs even though, upon some reflection, I realize that it is ultimately unjustified. For example, we all use inductive reasoning. However, as David Hume argues, we have to realize that induction is ultimately unjustified in some fundamental sense. In using induction, then, or any other method, am I not being a rational agent? In other words, why does the choice have to be between accepting a belief-testing method without scrutiny and endlessly scrutinizing a belief-testing method? Isn't that a false choice?
• Why do I have to "verify everything" in order to be an independent rational agent? Perhaps I don't have the physical and mental power to discover new truths in every domain of knowledge. However, once a discovery is made in a certain domain of knowledge, I can engage in some critical reflection about the nature of that discovery. For example, if I read a report about the Alvarez theory of dinosaur extinction, I may not be able to understand the technical details (e.g., concerning iridium levels and quartz particles). But I can still exercise my critical faculties in evaluating the report, e.g., I can use Ronald Giere's program for evaluating theoretical hypotheses.

From Understanding Scientific Reasoning (2002).

The basic point, then, is that critical thinking is not an all-or-nothing thing. Rather, it is a matter of degree. What do you think?

[PHI 1000] Can Machines Think Like Us?

John Searle argues that computing machines cannot think like us. His argument is based on a thought experiment and can be stated as follows:

1. Computing machines can think like us only if a machine can run a program for Chinese and thereby come to understand Chinese.
2. A machine can run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to understand Chinese.
3. Therefore, machines cannot think like us. (That is, machines can follow syntactic rules to manipulate symbols, but they do not have an understanding of meaning or semantics.)

Now, meet Watson.


Watson is able to answer Jeopardy questions by testing hypotheses. Isn't that how we think (at least sometimes)? If so, does that mean that Watson can think like us? In other words, if we can't tell whether it is Watson or a human being who is answering Jeopardy questions, does that mean that Watson has a mind?

[PL 431] One's modus ponens is another's modus tollens

Robert Nozick's thought experiment about the experience machine is supposed to show that motivational hedonism, i.e., the view that we are motivated only by pleasure and pain, is false. The argument is supposed to go roughly like this:

1. Motivational hedonism is true only if we would want to plug into the experience machine.
2. We would not want to plug into the experience machine because we want to do certain things, we want to be a certain way, and we want to be in contact with reality.
3. Therefore, motivational hedonism is false.

The force of the argument comes from Nozick's intuition that we would not want to plug into the experience machine. But suppose one doesn't share that intuition. Suppose one thinks that it would be great to plug into the experience machine. After all, one gets to experience everything one wants to experience without ever breaking a sweat; all from the comfort of one's home. Sounds like a dream come true!

If so, then one could argue as follows:

1. If we would want to plug into the experience machine, then motivational hedonism is true.
2. We would want to plug into the experience machine because we will get to experience everything we want to experience from the comfort of our home without breaking a sweat (and our wallet).
3. Therefore, motivational hedonism is true.

Both arguments are valid. Which do you find more convincing?

[INTER 2103] Do migrant workers in Israel have rights?

In the wake of attacks against migrant workers in Tel Aviv, some Israeli politicians came out in favor of deporting migrant workers. The Prime Minister, Netanyahu, fearing that "Israel could be overrun by African infiltrators," has given his support for building a border fence and "physically removing the infiltrators." The Interior Minister, Eli Yishai, has gone so far as to say that migrant workers should be arrested and placed in "detention facilities."

Assuming The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as our framework for a global ethics, and supposing that migrant workers will indeed be arrested, detained, and deported, would that constitute an abuse of human rights? If so, which human rights?

[PHI 1000] Mirror Neurons & Free Will

Suppose it turns out to be true that mirror neurons are the neurological basis of the human ability to imitate. 

Watch Mirror Neurons on PBS. See more from NOVA scienceNOW. 

Now, consider the following argument: 

1. If imitation has a neurological basis, then it is causally determined by neurological factors.
2. If imitation is causally determined by neurological factors, then much of human culture is causally determined by neurological factors, since much of human culture is based on imitation.
3. Therefore, if imitation has a neurological basis, then much of human culture is causally determined by neurological factors. 

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound? If so, what are its implications regarding free will?

[PL 211] Can we trust experts?

The following is a variation on a dilemma discussed by Sextus Empiricus (who apparently attributes it to Anacharsis the Scythian):

1. An expert's assertion can be judged to be correct or incorrect either by another expert or by a non-expert.
2. An expert's assertion cannot be judged to be correct or incorrect by another expert because the latter expert is biased.
3. An expert's assertion cannot be judged to be correct or incorrect by a non-expert because a non-expert lacks the required expertise.
4. Therefore, an expert's assertion can be judged to be correct or incorrect neither by another expert nor by a non-expert (i.e., no one can judge whether an expert's assertion is correct or incorrect).

What do you think about this dilemma? Does it mean that we cannot trust experts?

[PHI 1000] One's modus ponens is another's modus tollens

Based on his thought experiment about Mary the neuroscientist, Frank Jackson argues roughly as follows: 

1. All information is physical information only if Mary, who has all the physical information concerning human color vision before her release, does not learn something new about color upon her release.
2. Mary does learn something new about color upon her release.
3. Therefore, not all information is physical information.

 To this argument, Daniel Dennett has replied by arguing roughly as follows:

1. If Mary, who has all the physical information concerning human color vision before her release, does not learn something new about color upon her release, then all information is physical information.
2. Mary does not learn something new about color upon her release.
3. Therefore, all information is physical information.

Both arguments are valid. Which do you find more convincing?  

[PL 431] Choosing when to die?

What do you think about the following analogy?

newborn baby : birth :: terminal patient : death

1. A newborn baby is a human being who cannot choose whether to be born or die.
2. A terminal patient is also a human being who cannot choose whether or not to be born.
3. Therefore, a terminal patient should not be able to choose whether or not to die.

Just as humans do not choose when to be born, the argument goes, they should not be able to choose when to die. Is this a strong argument?

[HIST 2297] Is Pegasus observable?

In Utilitarianism, Mill writes as follows:

[T]he sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.

No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness.

Mill has been accused of making an argument that commits the fallacy of equivocation because the term 'desirable' is ambiguous. More explicitly, it seems that Mill argues as follows: 

1. Whatever is desired is desirable. 
2. Happiness is desired. 
3. Therefore, happiness is desirable. 

Some have argued that 'desirable' is used in a descriptive sense in the first premise to refer to what is able to be desired, and in a normative sense in the conclusion to refer to what ought to be desired.

Now, instead of 'desirable', consider 'observable'. Constructive empiricists, such as van Fraassen, argue that "science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate." A theory is empirically adequate, according to van Fraassen, just in case "what it says about the observable things and events in the world is true."

Critics (e.g., Kitcher) have argued that constructive empiricists have to abandon belief in prehistorical entities, such as dinosaurs, since their existence is inferred from the fossil record. To this, constructive empiricists respond by arguing that the observable/unobservable and the existent/non-existent distinctions are independent. In support of this claim, constructive empiricists (Muller and van Fraassen 2008) say the following:

Before we know whether Pegasus exists or not, we classify it as observable; it is in part because flying horses are observable that we are so sure there aren't any (original emphasis).

What's the argument here? Maybe it's supposed to go something like this:

1. Whatever can be observed is observable.
2. Flying horses can be observed.
3. Therefore, flying horses are observable.

Is this a valid argument? Or does it commit the fallacy of equivocation? Compared to Mill's argument, is it the case that 'observable' in the first premise is used in a descriptive sense (i.e,. what is able to be observed), whereas 'observable' in the conclusion is used in a normative sense (i.e., what ought to be able to be observed)?

[INTER 2103] Money, Power, and Wall Street

This is an interesting Frontline special on the global financial crisis: Money, Power and Wall Street.

Watch Money, Power and Wall Street: Part Four on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Assuming The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as our framework for a global ethics, and given the current state of the global economy, can one argue that financial institutions are responsible for human rights violations? If so, which human rights?

[PHI 3000] Is much of philosophy not really philosophy?

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to rationalize is to "attempt to explain or justify (behavior or an attitude) with logical reasons, even if these are not appropriate." Rationalizing, in this pejorative sense, is more like making excuses and is usually done after the fact. For example, after I eat chocolate, I might rationalize my action (i.e., make an excuse) by saying that chocolate has antioxidants. But that is not why I ate chocolate in the first place. To put the same point in terms of beliefs, rather than actions, we could say that to rationalize is to find excuses for our beliefs.

Unlike rationalizing, reasoning (i.e., to reason) is drawing conclusions from evidence or reasons. To put the point in terms of beliefs, we could say that to reason is to find beliefs that are worthy of acceptance.

The red arrow depicts rationalization, whereas the green arrow depicts reasoning.

Now, it seems that, at times, philosophy has been more about rationalizing than reasoning. Here are just a few examples:

• Philosophy of religion: Starting with the belief that God exists and trying to find reasons (or excuses) for this belief.
• Metaphysics: Starting with the belief that human beings have free will and trying to find reasons (or excuses) for this belief.
• Epistemology: Starting with the belief that we know certain facts and trying to find an analysis of knowledge that accommodates this belief.
• Philosophy of Science: Starting with the belief that science is a rational enterprise and trying to find a philosophy of science that accommodates this belief.
• Ethics: Starting with the belief that we are obligated to do only what we can do and trying to find a moral theory that accommodates this belief.

Are these fair characterizations of these philosophical projects? If so, is this a problem?

[PHI 3000] Does the method of cases rest on a mistake?

In light of the excellent feedback I received from readers of the Experimental Philosophy blog, I think there are actually two analogical arguments that can be made with respect to the method of cases (i.e., the method of appealing to intuitive judgments elicited by thought experiments).

Analogy 1: perceptual judgments : artificial perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : negative thought experiments

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by artificial perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted image.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted scenario.
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.

By "negative thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that are deliberately designed to refute a given theory by showing that it is at odds with the intuitive judgments that the thought experiments are supposed to elicit. For instance, Jackson's thought experiment about Mary is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that Mary learned something new upon seeing red, and this intuition is then used as evidence against physicalism.

This sort of negative thought experiment is analogous to artificial perceptual illusions, such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, which are deliberately designed to trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that line (a) is longer than line (b).

Muller-Lyer Illusion

Analogy 2:  perceptual judgments : natural perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : positive thought experiments

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by natural perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a distorted image.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are elicited by unusual situation that present to the subject a distorted scenario (albeit not deliberately).
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.

By "positive thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that seek to elicit certain intuitive judgments as support for a theory. For instance, Thomson's thought experiment about the violinist is not used to refute a particular theory, but rather to explore the moral permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances. The thought experiment is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that one is not morally obligated to remain attached to the violinist, and so, by analogy, that abortion is morally permissible even if a fetus has a right to life.

This sort of positive thought experiment is analogous to natural perceptual illusions, such as a mirage, which are naturally occurring optical phenomena that can (albeit not deliberately) trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that the road is wet.

Hot-Road (Fake Water) Mirage

What do you think about these analogical arguments?

[PHI 3000] Does philosophical method rest on a mistake?

[cross-posted on Experimental Philosophy]

Consider the following analogy: 

perceptual judgments : perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : intuition pumps

1. Perceptual judgments elicited by perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because they are typically elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.
2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps are typically elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.
3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps are unlikely to be correct.

The way I see this analogy is the following:

Square A seems darker than square B.
http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow_illusion.html

Pushing the fat man off the bridge seems wrong.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/10foot.html

Just as perceptual judgments elicited by perceptual illusions, such as the checkerboard illusion, are unlikely to be correct, intuitive judgments elicited from thought-experiments, such as the Trolley Problem, are unlikely to be correct, since both perceptual illusions and intuition pumps are elicited by unusual situations that are ambiguous.

What do you make of this argument?

[PHI 3000] So what if we don't know what we think we know?

It is often said that an analysis of knowledge that entails that we do not know anything except the truths of mathematics and logic must be wrong. But why?

In other words, many accept something like the following argument:

1. According to a Cartesian analysis of knowledge, S knows that p only if p is absolutely certain.
2. But few propositions can be known with absolute certainty.
3. Therefore, a Cartesian analysis of knowledge must be incorrect.

But why should we accept this argument? So what if it turns out that we don't really know many of the things we think we know?

[PHI 3000] Preface Paradox and Cognitive Dissonance

The Preface Paradox arises because an author supposedly believes each proposition in her book but she also believes that she is fallible, and so her book surely contains some mistakes. She might express that latter belief by writing in the preface to her book something along the lines of "Despite my best efforts, I'm sure that this book, like all books, contains some mistakes."

Accordingly, these two beliefs (i.e., that each proposition in her book is true and that at least one is false) are apparently contradictory.

One response to the Preface Paradox is to deny the conjunction principle. (According to the conjunction principle, if one believes P1 and one believes P2, then one believes P1 and P2). So, the author believes P1 and she believes P2, and so on. But that doesn't mean that she believes P1 and P2, and ... Pn.

If we reject the conjunction principle, however, does it mean that epistemic agents cannot have flat-out contradictory beliefs?

Consider the following example:

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Craig T. Nelson: I've been on food-stamps and welfare. Anybody helped me out? No!

Nelson seems to believe the following propositions:

1. I was on food-stamps and welfare.
2. No one helped me out.

If Nelson believes (1) and he believes (2), does it follow that he believes (1) and (2)?

Are (1) and (2) flat-out contradictory?

[PL 431] "Playing God" and Life Support

One argument against the moral permissibility of euthanasia goes roughly like this:

1. It is morally impermissible to take direct action designed to kill a terminal patient.
2. Active euthanasia is taking direct action designed to kill a terminal patient.
3. Therefore, active euthanasia is morally impermissible.

On the other hand, passive euthanasia is taken to be morally permissible, at least sometimes.

1. It is morally permissible to withhold treatment from a terminal patient and let nature take its course.
2. Passive euthanasia is withholding treatment from a terminal patient and letting nature take its course.
3. Therefore, passive euthanasia is morally permissible.

The active/passive euthanasia distinction is often motivated by "playing God" considerations. That is to say, it is argued that directly killing a terminal patient is "playing God," i.e., intervening in the natural course of events, whereas withholding treatment is simply letting nature take it course.

If this is so, then why not let nature take its course when terminal patients need to be put on life-support? In other words, are those who appeal to the active/passive euthanasia distinction committed to something like the argument below?

1. It is morally impermissible to take direct action designed to prolong the life of a terminal patient.
2. Putting a terminal patient on life-support is taking direct action designed to prolong the life of a terminal patient.
3. Therefore, putting a terminal patient on life-support is morally impermissible.

Is putting a terminal patient on life-support "playing God" (i.e., intervening in the natural course of events) just as active euthanasia is claimed to be?

[PHI 3000] The Audioslave Problem

One version of the argument from design is an analogical argument that goes roughly like this:

1. Man-made artifacts exhibit design because they were created by intelligent beings.
2. Nature exhibits design.
3. Therefore, nature was created by an intelligent being.

As Philo points out in David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, there are several problems with the man-made artifacts : human designer :: nature : divine designer (or, as it is more commonly known, watch : watchmaker :: world : world-maker) analogy:

• If we take this analogy seriously, then we might as well conclude that nature was created by a committee of divine designers, since man-made artifacts usually take more than one person to make.
• If we take this analogy seriously, then we might as well conclude that nature was created by a malevolent divine designer, since natural disasters bring about pain and suffering to living creatures.

The latter, of course, leads to the Problem of Evil.

Now, consider another, similar question. According to many theists, life is supposed to be a gift from God. At the very least, life is something that is granted to humans by God. If that is the case, given the man-made artifacts : human designer :: nature : divine designer analogy, doesn't it seem strange that God would give us something without a single and clear instruction manual? After all, man-made artifacts come with a single and clear instruction manual. So, by analogy....

If one takes the man-made artifacts : human designers :: nature : divine designer analogy seriously, it seems that one can argue as follows:

1. If the divine designer were like human designers, then the divine designer would give us a single, clear instruction manual with the gift of life.
2. The gift of life doesn't come with a single, clear instruction manual.
3. Therefore, the divine designer is not like human designers.

What do you make of this argument? Does it show that the man-made artifacts : human designers :: nature : divine designer analogy, and hence the analogical argument from design, is weak?

[PHI 1000] Chronicle and Determinism

1. If Andrew (Chronicle) used his powers for evil because he was abused by his father and bullied in school, then he became evil through no fault of his own.
2. If he became evil through no fault of his own, then he cannot be held morally responsible for his actions.
3. Therefore, if Andrew used his powers for evil because he was abused by his father and bullied in school, then he cannot be held morally responsible for his actions.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?

[PHI 3000] Intuition takes me there

The previous post about mistrust of science raises another interesting question.

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In this clip, Noelle Nikpour claims that people would intuitively realize that "some of the numbers that the scientists are putting out are not right."

This seems like an odd claim to make. It seems unreasonable to deny a scientific claim because it is counter-intuitive. For example, entanglement is a counter-intuitive quantum effect. But no one would claim that it is not real just because it is counter-intuitive.

So, why is it that, unlike in science, being counter-intuitive seems to always count against a philosophical claim? For example, the intuition that it would be morally permissible to flip the switch but morally impermissible to push the fat man off the bridge in the Trolley Problem is supposed to count against utilitarianism. But why? Why not say, "If our intuitions clash with the theory, then so much the worse for our intuitions," just as we often say in science?

[HIST 2297] Science: What's It Up To?

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Why are (some) people suspicious of science? Is it because they don't understand scientific findings? If so, would scientific literacy help make people less suspicious of science?

[PL 211] At least be consistent

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Is Missouri state representative Wanda Brown being inconsistent?

If she thinks that firing someone for owning guns is unjust does logical consistency require that she also think that firing someone for being gay is unjust?

Similarly, if she supports the right of gun-owners not to be fired for owning guns does logical consistency require that she also support the right of gay people not to be fired for being gay?

[PL 431] Person Plants and Fetal Cells

As part of her defense of abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson offers the following analogy:

people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not--despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective.

The homeowner : person-plant :: woman : fetus analogy is supposed to show that a woman who has taken all reasonable precautions against getting pregnant, but does get pregnant because of faulty contraception, is not morally obligated to keep the fetus, just as the homeowner is not morally obligated to let the person-plant grow in her house.

Now, suppose that the person-plant growing in the homeowner's house is making the homeowner feel better. That is to say, suppose that the homeowner used to suffer from allergy symptoms, such as hives, hay fever, coughing, etc. But now that the person-plant is growing in her house, all the allergy symptoms are gone. The homeowner's health and quality of life have improved dramatically as a result of the person-plant's presence in her house.

Now does the homeowner have a moral obligation to let the person-plant grow in her house?

If you are inclined to answer yes, then consider the following: fetal cells in a woman's body can have either positive or negative effects on her health.




Now, suppose that we can tell in advance whether the cells of a fetus will have beneficial or harmful effects on a woman's health. If we accept Thomson's homeowner : person-plant :: woman : fetus analogy, are we committed to saying that it would be morally permissible to abort the fetuses that will have harmful effects on a woman's health and morally impermissible to abort the fetuses that will have beneficial effects on a woman's health?

[PHI 1000] Cultural Determinism

Arguments against free will (i.e., arguments for the incompatibility of human free will and causal determinism) usually go something like this:

1. We act freely only if we are in control of our actions.
2. We are not in control of our actions because those actions are causally determined by factors beyond our control.
3. Therefore, we do not act freely.

The causal factors that determine our actions can be referred to quite broadly as "nature and nurture." The "nature" category includes factors such as genetic makeup and physico-chemical brain structure. The nurture category includes factors such as upbringing and education. Although there was a debate in the social sciences concerning the relative importance of nature versus nurture, for the deterministic argument outlined above, it doesn't really make a difference if genes, say, play a more important role in determining our character and behavior than upbringing does. For both genetic makeup and upbringing are beyond our control. And so, the argument goes, whether it's genes or upbringing that ultimately determine what we do, they are beyond our control, and hence we do not act freely.

One of the standard attempts to reconcile free will and determinism is to say that humans are rational agents. As rational agents, humans can engage in rational deliberation. And if they act on the basis of reasons, then they act freely. But what if those reasons are not really our reasons? What if the reasons we act upon are ultimately beyond our control just as genetic makeup and upbringing are?

In Part II of What Makes Us Human?, Master Imitators, the narrator makes the following claim:

We believe we are rational creatures making rational choices. Yet so much of what we do we do simply because others are doing it.

Accordingly, one can make the following argument from cultural determinism:

1. We act freely only if we act on reasons that are truly our own.
2. We never act on reasons that are truly our own because those reasons are culturally determined by factors beyond our control.
3. Therefore, we never act freely.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound? 

[PHI 1000] Strawson's Basic Argument

Galen Strawson calls the following argument "The Basic Argument" for why humans are not ultimately morally responsible for their actions:

1. You do what you do—in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are.
2. So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain mental respects.
3. But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.

Strawson thinks that premise 3 is true because the way we are is ultimately determined by genetic inheritance and early experience, both of which are beyond our control.

So far so good. But then Strawson says something rather puzzling:

According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false. We can’t be ultimately morally responsible either way.

What does he mean by that?

First, isn't premise 1 a deterministic premise? Premise 1 says that what you do is determined by the way you are. In other words, you do what you do because of the way you are at that time. The way you are, then, determines your actions. So, if determinism is false, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Second, doesn't the support for premise 3 come from a deterministic claim according to which the way you are is determined by genetic inheritance and early experience? Since the way you are is determined by factors over which you have no control (namely, genetic inheritance and early experience), you cannot be ultimately morally responsible for the way you are. So, if determinism is false, then premise 3 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Of course, Strawson rightly points out that, even if indeterminism is true (i.e., the way we are and what we do are indeterminate), it doesn't follow that we are ultimately morally responsible for our actions, since, in order to be responsible for our actions, we have to be in control of the way we are. But we cannot be in control of the way we are if the way we are is indeterminate. Still, if the way we are and our actions are indeterminate, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false, since that premise says that what we do is determined by the way we are.

So what does Strawson mean when he says that "According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false"?

[PL 431] Trolley Problem and rule-utilitarianism

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/10foot.html?_r=1

The Trolley Problem presents the following challenge to utilitarianism:

1. According to utilitarianism, sacrificing one person to save four is always a good moral reason.
2. But pushing a fat man off a bridge to save four workers who are about to be killed by a runaway trolley doesn't seem like the right thing to do.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that sacrificing one person to save four people is always a good moral reason. 

Can the utilitarian use the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism to meet this challenge? Suppose the utilitarian argues as follows:

From an act-utilitarian point of view, the problem arises because the act of pulling the lever seems right (because one person is sacrificed for the sake of four) but the act of pushing the fat man seems wrong (even though one person is sacrificed for the sake of four). 

However, from a rule-utilitarian point of view, both pulling the lever and pushing the fat man would be morally impermissible because it would make utilitarian sense to have a rule that prohibits people from sacrificing others for reasons that they (i.e., those who are being scarified) do not share. In other words, following the moral rule that says "Don't sacrifice people without their consent" makes utilitarian sense in the long run.

Is this a satisfactory response to the aforementioned challenge to utilitarianism?

[PL 431] Bill Gates and the Violinist

Judith Jarvis Thomson's defense of abortion is based on the following analogy: you : violinist :: woman : fetus. I take it that the analogical argument is supposed to go like this:

1. If you are kidnapped and attached to a sick violinist who needs to be plugged in to your circulatory system for nine months in order to survive, you have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist.
2. In cases of unwanted pregnancy (e.g., as a result of rape or birth control malfunction), a woman has to carry an "unwanted" fetus for nine months.
3. Therefore, in a case of unwanted pregnancy, a woman is not morally obligated to refrain from aborting an "unwanted" fetus.

The strength of this argument depends on the strength of the analogy between the violinist scenario and an unwanted pregnancy. Thomson seems to think that (most?) people would agree that you have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist, and so, by analogy, a woman has no moral obligation to carry an "unwanted" fetus for nine months. Of course, it would be admirable if you did help the sick violinist. But you are not morally obligated to do so.

Now, let's change the scenario a little bit. Suppose that it is Bill Gates who has been abducted by the Society of Music Lovers and plugged in to the violinist. The reasoning of the Society for Music Lovers is the following: Bill Gates is super-rich, so staying in bed attached to a violinist for nine months would not hurt him financially. If anyone can afford staying in bed for nine months, it's Bill Gates. Plus, he doesn't work anyway except doing charity work. So this would be a great opportunity for him to do a good deed.

Does Bill Gates have a moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist?