Wednesday, May 16, 2012

[PHI 3000] Does the method of cases rest on a mistake?

In light of the excellent feedback I received from readers of the Experimental Philosophy blog, I think there are actually two analogical arguments that can be made with respect to the method of cases (i.e., the method of appealing to intuitive judgments elicited by thought experiments).

Analogy 1: perceptual judgments : artificial perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : negative thought experiments
  1. Perceptual judgments elicited by artificial perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted image.
  2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a deliberately distorted scenario.
  3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by negative thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.
By "negative thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that are deliberately designed to refute a given theory by showing that it is at odds with the intuitive judgments that the thought experiments are supposed to elicit. For instance, Jackson's thought experiment about Mary is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that Mary learned something new upon seeing red, and this intuition is then used as evidence against physicalism.

This sort of negative thought experiment is analogous to artificial perceptual illusions, such as the Muller-Lyer illusion, which are deliberately designed to trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that line (a) is longer than line (b).

Muller-Lyer Illusion


Analogy 2:  perceptual judgments : natural perceptual illusions :: intuitive judgments : positive thought experiments
  1. Perceptual judgments elicited by natural perceptual illusions are unlikely to be correct because such judgments are elicited by unusual situations that present to the subject a distorted image.
  2. Like perceptual judgments, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are elicited by unusual situation that present to the subject a distorted scenario (albeit not deliberately).
  3. Therefore, intuitive judgments elicited by positive thought experiments are unlikely to be correct.
By "positive thought experiments" I mean thought experiments that seek to elicit certain intuitive judgments as support for a theory. For instance, Thomson's thought experiment about the violinist is not used to refute a particular theory, but rather to explore the moral permissibility of abortion under certain circumstances. The thought experiment is supposed to elicit the intuitive judgment that one is not morally obligated to remain attached to the violinist, and so, by analogy, that abortion is morally permissible even if a fetus has a right to life.

This sort of positive thought experiment is analogous to natural perceptual illusions, such as a mirage, which are naturally occurring optical phenomena that can (albeit not deliberately) trick onlookers into making false judgments, e.g., that the road is wet.

Hot-Road (Fake Water) Mirage
What do you think about these analogical arguments?
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4 comments:

  1. AnonymousJune 4, 2012 at 5:35 AM

    Hi Moti,
    Well, I think that you're right to highlight how much analogous are intuitive judgments and perceptual judgments (I've written something about how long this analogy may work).Indeed in both cases, it is about a seeming - in the case of intuitive judgments, often authors talk about intellectual seemings while in the case of perceptual illusions, more broadly perceptual judgments, a perceptual seeming is at play. So in that respect, both intuitive and perceptual illusions stem from a sort of seeming that isn't attuned to reality.
    However, I would not analyze these illusory seemings the same way. First, because there are crucial aspects which distinguish the nature of perceptual judgments from the nature of intuitive judgments, such that we must be cautious about not following the analogy too far - and this must be when considering the kinds of illusion to which intuitions and perceptual judgments are subject. Intuitive illusions may not stem from the very same reasons as perceptual illusions. Moreover, they may not be solved the same way either. Some argue that intuitive illusions are far more persistent than are visual illusions (they point out that when one becomes aware that one has been trapped by an optical illusion, one is able to change one's belief accordingly while when one is aware of one's intuitive flaws, it is much more difficult for one to deny one's prior intuition). Now, this does not seem to refute the sort of methodological analogy you point to. Still, once you admit that intuitive illusions are of an abstract and intellectual kinds while perceptual illusions are of a concrete and more sensitive species, then the analogy must be weaker than it might seem for althought the conditions for eliciting such illusions are quite the same, the illusions we come to elicit are not. Besides, what I think you rightly underline is the kind of experimental manipulation that is at work. But the fact that the method of cases sometimes appeals to unusual and maybe misleading scenarios does not mean that without such a misleading manipulation, intuitive flaws would disappear. What is at concern is the sensitivity of our intuitions to truth or to philosophically relevant factors. Consider priming effects. You can say that they are the result of experimental manipulations - without the priming, we would not observe priming effects. But this does not mean that such priming effects are entirely the fact of experimental manipulations. They must occur even in natural settings, where there is no manipulation of the experimental kind. Likewise, we do naturally have perceptual seemings that aren't true and we must have false intuitive seemings even when not influenced by unusual factors or when not considering unusual scenarios.
    Now, undoubtedly there is a striking analogy to be made bewteen the way our perceptual and intuitive seemings may be misleading. If your point is that it is these seemings which are the point of analogy, so I entirely agree. For indeed these are different kinds of illusory seemings but it is about seemings, still - and that's an important point of comparison.

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    Replies
    1. UnknownJune 4, 2012 at 11:04 AM

      Thanks very much for your thoughtful comment.

      I agree that the main point of analogy between intuitive judgments and perceptual judgments is that both are seemings. Of course, the analogy is not perfect but I think it can be made strong enough so as to give us pause before we use intellectual seemings elicited by thought experiments as evidence.

      By the way, I would like to read the work you alluded to in your comment. Could you provide references? Thanks.

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    2. AnonymousJune 6, 2012 at 2:12 PM

      Thanks for your reply.
      Well the paper I refer to is written in French and I have just finished to translate it into English. Therefore, I fear that it might not be either on-line or published before long. Naturally, I can send you a manuscript. Your comments would be helpful. Otherwise, I can warn you when it will be on-line.
      There is an interesting (not recent) work made by Kent Bach I would recommend you:
      Bach, K. (1984). Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice, Pacific Philosophical Quaterly, 65, 37-58.
      I think one important author who addresses such an issue is Ernst Sosa, too.
      Best regard

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    3. UnknownJune 6, 2012 at 7:59 PM

      Thanks for the reference.
      I'd be happy to read your paper. Please email me at motimizra [at] gmail [dot] com.

      Delete

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