[PL 431] What, if anything, makes someone a moral authority?

Is there such a thing as a moral authority? Are there experts in matters of ethics and morality?

Who is a moral expert?

Some people consider religious authorities to be the ones to go to with questions about right and wrong. Does a moral authority have to be a religious authority as well?

In The Republic, Plato envisions a society governed by philosopher-kings. One might think that these philosopher-kings are moral authorities as well. Indeed, Plato says that their education aims not only at the attainment of virtues, such as courage, but also at knowledge of the Good. If philosopher-kings have knowledge of the Good, then are they the ones to go to with questions about right and wrong?

[PHI 3000] Sensory Illusions

In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes puts forward something like the following argument:

1. My senses (particularly, my sense of vision) tell me that the line on the right is longer than the line on the left (see image of Muller-Lyer illusion below).
2. Based on what I see, I come to believe that the line on the right is longer than the line on the left.
3. But the two lines are of equal length (as we can find out by measuring them).
4. Hence, my senses led me to believe a false statement (namely, that the line on the right is longer than the line on the left).
5. If my senses made me believe a false statement once, I cannot be sure that it will not happen again.
6. My senses made me believe a false statement once.
7. Therefore, I cannot be sure that my senses won't deceive me again (i.e., make me believe false statements).

Muller-Lyer illusion

One of the ways in which empiricists have responded to this worry about the senses is by saying that information received by means of one sensory modality can be verified by information received by means of another sensory modality. For example, Locke says that we can confirm a report from one of the senses with another report from another sense (e.g., if I doubt that I see a fire, I can approach it and feel its warmth). According to Locke, "Our senses, in many cases, bear witness to the truth of each other's report concerning the existence of sensible things without us."

However, given what we now know about how the senses work, it seems that this empiricist reply will not do. Instead of confirming each other's reports, it seems that the senses often override each other's reports. For example, a phenomenon known as the McGurk effect shows that visual reports override auditory reports.

Is this a problem for empiricists? If so, how might empiricists respond to this challenge?

[PHI 3000] Skepticism about the External World

So you think you're having a beer?

The skeptic: Do you think we know that we're having a beer together at this moment?

The dude: I guess.

The skeptic: Well, you're wrong, and I can prove it.

The dude: So prove it.

The skeptic: What if we're brains in a vat. We're hooked up to a computer that transmits images of a bar, people, drinks, and so on, and so we think that we're having a beer together, when in fact we are just brains in a vat.

The dude: So what?

The skeptic: So everything we believe about the world could be false. For example, we believe that we're having a beer right now. But we believe that just because the computer is transmitting these images to our brains. In reality, there is no bar, no beer, and no friend.

The dude: I don't get it.

The skeptic: Don't you see? If we can't be sure that we are not brains in a vat, then we can't be sure that we're having a beer right now.

The dude: So, are you saying that we don't know that we're having a beer right now?

The skeptic: Exactly!

The dude: How do you know that?

The skeptic: Know what?

The dude: That we don't know that we're having a beer right now.

The skeptic: Oh, because we don't know that we're not brains in a vat.

The dude: So we do know that we don't know that we're having a beer right now?

The skeptic: Wait,... No. We don't know that, either.

The dude: Well, if you don't know what you're talking about, why should I listen to you?

~

Is the skeptic's position self-defeating? If so, is there a way to restate the skeptic's position that would avoid this problem?

[PHI 3000] Aristotle vs. Cypher

Do you agree with Aristotle or with Cypher? Is knowing always better than being ignorant? Is it ever good to be ignorant?

[PL 431] The Cultural Differences Argument

In "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism," Rachels argues that the Cultural Differences Argument is invalid.

The Cultural Differences Argument is the following:

1. Different cultures have different moral codes.
2. Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion and opinions vary from culture to culture.

Rachels argues that this argument is invalid because the claim that there is no objective "truth" about a particular subject matter does not follow from the fact that there is a disagreement about what the truth is. He gives the following refutation by analogy:

1. Some people believe that the earth is flat, whereas others believe that it is an oblate spheroid.
2. Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in geography (i.e., there is no fact of the matter about whether the earth is flat or an oblate spheroid).

Is this a convincing refutation by analogy of the Cultural Differences Argument? How might the moral relativist reply to this refutation?

[PHI 1000] What is it like to be a bat?

Does the case of Ben Underwood show that humans can experience what is it like to be a bat? What would Nagel say about this case?

[PL 211] Frankfurt on Truth

Harry Frankfurt on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart discussing his book On Truth.

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[PL 211] Frankfurt on BS

Harry Frankfurt on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart discussing his book On Bullshit.

What is the difference between lying and BS, according to Frankfurt?

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[PL 211] Categorical Syllogisms and Inductive Arguments

In Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (Fifth Edition, 2007), Merrilee H. Salmon compares the categorical syllogism to what she describes as "an incorrect form of inductive argument" (p. 127). The categorical syllogism has the following form (Salmon 2007, p. 128):

All Fs are Gs.

All Gs are Hs.

--------------

All Fs are Hs.

For example (Salmon 2007, p. 128):

All humans are mammals.

All mammals are animals.

--------------------------

All humans are animals.

According to Salmon (2007, p. 128), "This particular form of the categorical syllogism is valid, which means the consistent substitution of any class for each occurrence of the letters F, G, and H will result in a [valid] deductive argument."

Salmon then compares the categorical syllogism with the following form of an inductive argument by replacing all with most (Salmon 2007, p. 128): 

Most Fs are Gs. 

Most Gs are Hs.  

------------------- 

Most Fs are Hs.

Salmon says that this argument is inductively incorrect. To illustrate this, Salmon gives the following argument (Salmon 2007, p. 128):  

Most physicists are men. 

Most men are nonphysicists. 

------------------------------ 

Most physicists are nonphysicists.

And then Salmon (2007, p. 128) gives the following explanation:

Despite its true premises, the conclusion of this argument is a self-contradiction. This incorrect form exemplifies the danger of supposing that all correct inductive argument forms are just slightly weakened versions of deductive forms.

This passage suggests that Salmon thinks that this inductive form is incorrect because the conclusion of this inductive argument is a self-contradiction. However, the fact that the conclusion of this argument is a self-contradiction cannot be what makes it an instance of an incorrect inductive form. To see why, consider the categorical syllogism again and the following substitution instance:

All physicists are men. 

All men are nonphysicists. 

---------------------------- 

All physicists are nonphysicists.

The conclusion of this argument is also a self-contradiction. So, if we say that the aforementioned inductive argument exemplifies an incorrect form of inductive argument because its conclusion is a self-contradiction, wouldn't we also have to say, by parity of reasoning, that this deductive argument exemplifies an invalid form of deductive argument because its conclusion is a self-contradiction? And, if this is correct, does this mean that the categorical syllogism is an invalid form of deductive argument?

[PL 211] What's the fallacy?

Which of the following fallacies is committed by the anchor in this clip?

[PL 211] What's the fallacy?

Which of the following fallacies is committed by the anchor in this clip?

[PHI 1000] What Makes Us Human?

In my Philosophy of the Human Person class, we watched What Makes Us Human?.




In Part I, "Mystery of the Mind," the narrator makes the claim that what makes us human is our big brains. At one point, he says the following:

Ever since Aristotle, philosophers have wondered what makes us different from the beasts. Their answers, that man is a political animal, a thinking animal, a tool making animal, can now be discarded. Now when we ask what makes us human, we can answer "this gene and that one and that one." We can begin to write the recipe for making a human being.

Specifically, the gene ASPM is pointed out as the gene that is responsible for brain growth, and hence for the distinctively large human brain.

Mutations in the ASPM gene are the common cause for a condition known as autosomal recessive primary microcephaly. Even though microcephalics do not have a large brain as a result of mutations in the ASPM gene, the narrator says that they are human just like you and I.

Are these claims compatible? If what makes us human is our big brains, or the ASPM gene that is responsible for brain growth, then wouldn't we have to say that microcephalics are not human, since they don't have big brains because of mutations in that gene? On the other hand, if we say that microcephalics are human, even though they don't have big brains because of mutations in the ASPM gene, then wouldn't we have to say that it is not our big brains or the ASPM gene that make us human?

[PL 431] Moral Relativism

In "The Challenge of Cultural Relativism," James Rachels says that relativism consists of several claims:

1. Different societies have different moral codes. [empirical claim about societies]
2. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal code better than another. [meta-ethical claim about moral codes]
3. The moral code of our own society has no special status; it is merely one among many. [meta-ethical claim about moral codes]
4. There is no “universal truth” in ethics; that is, there are no moral truths that hold for all people at all times. [meta-ethical claim about moral truths]
5. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society’ that is, if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action is right, at least within that society. [normative claim about what is right/wrong]
6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other cultures. [normative claim about tolerance]

In one of my ethics classes, the following question came up during class discussions:

Imagine a world with many different societies very much like our own world. Unlike our world, however, all the societies in this world have converged on moral code X. These societies have never communicated with one another. But, it just so happens that all of them have adopted moral code X as their societal moral code. This is just a contingent fact about this world.

Now, the question is whether moral code X is universal in this world? What would a relativist say about this scenario?

[HIST 2297] Inference to the Best Explanation

For a while, the following ads for Jameson Whiskey appeared in New York subway trains:

In the ad, deliberately ridiculous explanations, such as those in the picture above, were given for why people drink Jameson. For example:

• People drink Jameson because the ads give tourists a place to look, so the guy in the map seat can get a break.
• People drink Jameson because there are nine wrong ways to swipe your card, but no wrong way to enjoy a Jameson.
• People drink Jameson because they like to share; not like that guy taking up two seats.
• People drink Jameson because Jameson would go really well with that song playing in your headphones.
• People drink Jameson because “Next round on me” is easier to understand than “stanclearclosindoor.” 

Then, one of the ads said "It could just be the taste."

These ads can be construed as an inference to the best explanation as follows:

1. People drink Jameson.
2. The best explanation for (1) is that Jameson tastes good.
3. No other explanation explains (1) as well as good taste does.
4. Therefore, (probably) Jameson tastes good. 

What makes the good taste explanation better than the alternative explanations listed above?

[HIST 2297] Never Say Never

In my History and Philosophy of Science course, we are reading Samir Okasha’s Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction. It’s an excellent introductory book of philosophy of science. 

During class discussions, a question came up about the following passage. Okasha (2002, p. 91) writes:

Kuhn’s insistence that there is no algorithm for theory choice in science is almost certainly correct. For no-one has ever succeeded in producing such an algorithm. Lots of philosophers and scientists have made plausible suggestions about what to look for in theories—simplicity, broadness of scope, close fit with the data, and so on. But these suggestions fall far short of providing a true algorithm, as Kuhn knew well.

Here, Okasha seems to argue as follows: 

1. No one has ever succeeded in producing an algorithm for theory choice in science. 
2. Therefore, no one will ever succeed in producing an algorithm for theory choice in science. (There is no such algorithm.)

My students and I were discussing whether the fact that no one has been able to accomplish something (e.g., producing an algorithm for theory choice) is a good reason to believe that it cannot be accomplished.

Surely, the fact that no one has been able to square the circle is a good reason to think that it cannot be done. But that is because squaring the circle is logically impossible. But producing an algorithm for theory choice doesn’t seem to be logically impossible. So, is the fact that no one has been able to come up with one thus far a good reason to believe that it cannot be done (or, more strongly, that there is no such algorithm)? 

How many failed attempts to accomplish something—which is not logically impossible—justify the conclusion that that thing cannot be accomplished?

[PL 211] Circular Reasoning

"People die in America because people die in America."
-Rick Santorum

Is there a more charitable way to read Santorum's argument?

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[PHI 3000] The Banana Argument for God's Existence

One of my students brought this to my attention:

It looks like a variation on the argument from design.

In that respect, my students and I discussed the fact that those who appeal to design seem to assume that one instance of design is supposed to entail that there is a designer. But what about all the things that do not appear to be designed (e.g., rocks)? Supposedly, the mark of design should be equally present in all things, since everything is supposed to be designed by God.

In other words, a proponent of this version of the argument from design could argue as follows:

1. If something exhibits design, then it must have been designed.
2. Many things in nature (such as bananas) exhibit design.
3. Therefore, many things in nature have been designed.

On the other hand, an opponent of this argument could argue as follows:

1. If something was designed, then it must exhibit design.
2. Some things (such as rocks) do not exhibit design.
3. Therefore, some things were not designed.

As Hillary Putnam once put it, one philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens.

Of course, proponents of this version of the argument from design could always reply by saying that God chose to make some things such that they appear to be designed and other things such that they do not appear to be designed. Would this be a convincing reply?

[PL 211] Experts and Hypocrisy

Is it the case that being hypocritical undermines an expert's claim that p?

Here's an example:

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If we think of Froma Harrop, a journalist and the President of the National Conference of Editorial Writers, as an expert in public discourse, then we might think that we should "tone down the rhetoric" because she says so, given that she's an expert in public discourse.

However, it seems that Harrop is being hypocritical, to some extent, because she has used inflammatory language in her columns. Does that undermine her status as an authority on public discourse? And if so, should we not believe that we should "tone down the rhetoric" just because she says so? (Although there might be other good reasons to believe that we should "tone down the rhetoric.")

[PL 211] Arguments from Authority

Introductory textbooks to critical thinking and informal logic usually include a chapter about arguments from authority (see, for example, Salmon's Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking and Hurley's A Concise Introduction to Logic).

Treatments of arguments from authority (AKA "appeals to authority") usually include the following conditions, without which an argument from authority would be fallacious:

1. The authority must be a genuine expert on the subject matter in question. If the authority that says that p is not an expert in the subject matter to which p is related, then the argument from authority is fallacious.
2. There must be an agreement among experts concerning the claim in question. If there is disagreement among experts regrading p, then the argument from authority would be fallacious.

But when, if ever, is the mere fact that an expert says that p sufficient reason to believe that p is true (or probable)? Is the mere fact that an expert says that p make it more likely that p is true?

Recent research has shown that experts are wrong more often than not. If this is true, can we trust experts?

[PL 431] The Vaccine War

Celebrities, such as Jenny McCarthy and Jim Carrey, campaign against vaccination, in particular the MMR vaccine, because they think that there is a causal connection between such vaccines and autism.

Watch The Vaccine War on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

The vaccination-autism controversy raises epistemological and ethical questions that can be looked at from a virtue theoretical perspective:

1. In terms of trait-virtues, such as conscientiousness and open-mindedness, do vaccine deniers have or lack such intellectual virtues?
2. Are vaccine deniers being epistemically virtuous? Are vaccine deniers being epistemically responsible?
3. Are vaccine deniers acting in an ethically virtuous manner? Are they acting in an ethically responsible manner?

[HUMN 2440] A Human Right to Medical Care?

This semester, I am teaching a course on human rights. We are discussing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows:

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

We discussed the following questions in class:

• Is there a human right to medical care?
• Is it morally wrong to deny people access to medical care? If so, why?
• Suppose there is a right to medical care, is it the case that some Americans are denied this human right?

While discussing these questions, we watched BBC Panorama's Poor in America:

Here is an argument made by one of my students:

1. The right to medical care is basic in the following sense: without medical care one cannot be healthy enough to live a potentially fulfilling life.
2. Living a potentially fulfilling life is a desirable thing.
3. Hence, we should make sure that people have the opportunity to live a potentially fulfilling life.
4. In order to make sure that people have the opportunity to live a potentially fulfilling life, we need to make sure that they are healthy enough to do so.
5. Therefore, we need to make sure that people are healthy enough to live a potentially fulfilling life. (It would be morally wrong to deny people access to medical care.)

What do you make of this argument?

On Crap Detection

In his “Bullshit and the Art of Crap-Detection” (Delivered at the National Convention for the Teachers of English, November 28, 1969, Washington, D.C.), Neil Postman said the following:

As I see it, the best things schools can do for kids is to help them learn how to distinguish useful talk from bullshit. I will ask only that you agree that every day in almost every way people are exposed to more bullshit than it is healthy for them to endure, and that if we can help them to recognize this fact, they might turn away from it and toward language that might do them some earthly good.

I think that Postman is right about the importance of teaching students to distinguish between “useful talk” and BS. I also think that the best way to teach students this skill is by sharpening their critical thinking skills. Without an understating of the basics of (informal) logic, one’s crap-detector would not function properly.

On this blog, I will post stuff that I find conducive to this aim, i.e., helping students master the art of crap-detection. So, I hope that my students—and other students as well—will find this blog helpful on their way to becoming crap detectives themselves.