[PHI 1000] Cultural Determinism

Arguments against free will (i.e., arguments for the incompatibility of human free will and causal determinism) usually go something like this:

1. We act freely only if we are in control of our actions.
2. We are not in control of our actions because those actions are causally determined by factors beyond our control.
3. Therefore, we do not act freely.

The causal factors that determine our actions can be referred to quite broadly as "nature and nurture." The "nature" category includes factors such as genetic makeup and physico-chemical brain structure. The nurture category includes factors such as upbringing and education. Although there was a debate in the social sciences concerning the relative importance of nature versus nurture, for the deterministic argument outlined above, it doesn't really make a difference if genes, say, play a more important role in determining our character and behavior than upbringing does. For both genetic makeup and upbringing are beyond our control. And so, the argument goes, whether it's genes or upbringing that ultimately determine what we do, they are beyond our control, and hence we do not act freely.

One of the standard attempts to reconcile free will and determinism is to say that humans are rational agents. As rational agents, humans can engage in rational deliberation. And if they act on the basis of reasons, then they act freely. But what if those reasons are not really our reasons? What if the reasons we act upon are ultimately beyond our control just as genetic makeup and upbringing are?

In Part II of What Makes Us Human?, Master Imitators, the narrator makes the following claim:

We believe we are rational creatures making rational choices. Yet so much of what we do we do simply because others are doing it.

Accordingly, one can make the following argument from cultural determinism:

1. We act freely only if we act on reasons that are truly our own.
2. We never act on reasons that are truly our own because those reasons are culturally determined by factors beyond our control.
3. Therefore, we never act freely.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound? 

[PHI 1000] Strawson's Basic Argument

Galen Strawson calls the following argument "The Basic Argument" for why humans are not ultimately morally responsible for their actions:

1. You do what you do—in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are.
2. So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain mental respects.
3. But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.

Strawson thinks that premise 3 is true because the way we are is ultimately determined by genetic inheritance and early experience, both of which are beyond our control.

So far so good. But then Strawson says something rather puzzling:

According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false. We can’t be ultimately morally responsible either way.

What does he mean by that?

First, isn't premise 1 a deterministic premise? Premise 1 says that what you do is determined by the way you are. In other words, you do what you do because of the way you are at that time. The way you are, then, determines your actions. So, if determinism is false, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Second, doesn't the support for premise 3 come from a deterministic claim according to which the way you are is determined by genetic inheritance and early experience? Since the way you are is determined by factors over which you have no control (namely, genetic inheritance and early experience), you cannot be ultimately morally responsible for the way you are. So, if determinism is false, then premise 3 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Of course, Strawson rightly points out that, even if indeterminism is true (i.e., the way we are and what we do are indeterminate), it doesn't follow that we are ultimately morally responsible for our actions, since, in order to be responsible for our actions, we have to be in control of the way we are. But we cannot be in control of the way we are if the way we are is indeterminate. Still, if the way we are and our actions are indeterminate, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false, since that premise says that what we do is determined by the way we are.

So what does Strawson mean when he says that "According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false"?

[PL 431] Trolley Problem and rule-utilitarianism

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/10foot.html?_r=1

The Trolley Problem presents the following challenge to utilitarianism:

1. According to utilitarianism, sacrificing one person to save four is always a good moral reason.
2. But pushing a fat man off a bridge to save four workers who are about to be killed by a runaway trolley doesn't seem like the right thing to do.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that sacrificing one person to save four people is always a good moral reason. 

Can the utilitarian use the distinction between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism to meet this challenge? Suppose the utilitarian argues as follows:

From an act-utilitarian point of view, the problem arises because the act of pulling the lever seems right (because one person is sacrificed for the sake of four) but the act of pushing the fat man seems wrong (even though one person is sacrificed for the sake of four). 

However, from a rule-utilitarian point of view, both pulling the lever and pushing the fat man would be morally impermissible because it would make utilitarian sense to have a rule that prohibits people from sacrificing others for reasons that they (i.e., those who are being scarified) do not share. In other words, following the moral rule that says "Don't sacrifice people without their consent" makes utilitarian sense in the long run.

Is this a satisfactory response to the aforementioned challenge to utilitarianism?

[PL 431] Bill Gates and the Violinist

Judith Jarvis Thomson's defense of abortion is based on the following analogy: you : violinist :: woman : fetus. I take it that the analogical argument is supposed to go like this:

1. If you are kidnapped and attached to a sick violinist who needs to be plugged in to your circulatory system for nine months in order to survive, you have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist.
2. In cases of unwanted pregnancy (e.g., as a result of rape or birth control malfunction), a woman has to carry an "unwanted" fetus for nine months.
3. Therefore, in a case of unwanted pregnancy, a woman is not morally obligated to refrain from aborting an "unwanted" fetus.

The strength of this argument depends on the strength of the analogy between the violinist scenario and an unwanted pregnancy. Thomson seems to think that (most?) people would agree that you have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist, and so, by analogy, a woman has no moral obligation to carry an "unwanted" fetus for nine months. Of course, it would be admirable if you did help the sick violinist. But you are not morally obligated to do so.

Now, let's change the scenario a little bit. Suppose that it is Bill Gates who has been abducted by the Society of Music Lovers and plugged in to the violinist. The reasoning of the Society for Music Lovers is the following: Bill Gates is super-rich, so staying in bed attached to a violinist for nine months would not hurt him financially. If anyone can afford staying in bed for nine months, it's Bill Gates. Plus, he doesn't work anyway except doing charity work. So this would be a great opportunity for him to do a good deed.

Does Bill Gates have a moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist? 

[HIST 2297] Does string theory make predictions?

It is often said that string theory is "not even wrong," i.e., that it makes no predictions. Brian Greene is one of the most well-known champions of string theory. A few years ago, Greene argued that string theory can make predictions; it's just that we cannot test these predictions because of our technological limitations.



So it seems that we need to distinguish between a theory's ability to make predictions and our inability to test those predictions because of technological limitations. In other words, making predictions is a formal property of a theory regardless of whether or not we have the technology to test those predictions, which is our limitation, not the theory's.

Now, if Greene is right, and string theory does make predictions, but we cannot currently test those predictions, then does that mean that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with string theory as a theory? After all, the fact that we cannot test the predictions of string theory now is simply a contingent fact about us, not the theory. We may be able to test the predictions of string theory sometime in the future.

Given this distinction between in-principle testable predictions (i.e., predictions that can be tested in principle but not in practice because of technological limitations) and in-practice testable predictions (i.e., predictions that can tested in practice), is it a legitimate objection against a theory, such as string theory, to say that it doesn't make in-practice testable predictions? On the other hand, is it reasonable to suspend judgment about a theory that makes only in-principle testable predictions, but not in-practice testable predictions?

More recently, Greene has argued that string theory actually makes in-practice testable predictions. According to Greene, string theory can predict the amount of dark energy in our universe, as opposed to other universes in the "multiverse," which is something that can be measured.



If Greene is right about string theory predicting the amount of dark energy in our universe, which can be measured, does that mean that string theory is a scientific theory?

[PL 431] Lake of Fire

In Lake of Fire, a graphic documentary about the abortion debate, Noam Chomsky accuses opponents of abortion of being inconsistent. If they are truly pro-life, Chomsky says, then they should care about all human life, wherever it is (both inside and outside the womb). For example, if they are really pro-life, Chomsky argues, opponents of abortion should also be against capital punishment.

For example, Paul Jennings Hill used to argue as follows:

1. Murderers should be executed.
2. Abortionists are murderers.
3. Therefore, abortionists should be executed.

If Chomsky is right, then Jennings Hill cannot accept premise (1) without contradicting himself, since he is pro-life.

Do you agree with Chomsky? Is it logically inconsistent to be pro-life and then argue that abortion is murder, and that abortion providers should be executed? If so, is there any way opponents of abortion can make sense of this inconsistency?

[PL 211] Philosophical Counseling

In discussing the value of philosophy, my students and I discussed whether or not philosophy has any therapeutic benefits. I mentioned the idea of philosophical counseling. For example, The School of Practical Philosophy and the American Philosophical Practitioners Association (APPA) advertise themselves as offering some sort of philosophical counseling to individuals.

A few interesting questions came up:

• Counseling is not something to be taken lightly; people's lives are at stake. Psychologists, for example, have to undergo extensive training before they can treat individuals. What, if anything, makes philosophers qualified to counsel people?
• The APPA seems to have a three-day certification training for philosophical counselors. Is this sufficient training before one can provide counseling?
• If the APPA itself is in charge of training, and there is no oversight by an independent body, should we find this kind of training as suspect as training in, say, Reiki? (See also Penn & Teller video below.)
• Has philosophical counseling been studied--in the same way that other treatments are studied--and shown to be an effective and safe treatment? If not, should it be studied before it is offered to people?