[PHI 2200] The Sisyphus Problem

In this TED talk, Peter Singer likens the modern consumer to Sisyphus. Just as Sisyphus has to roll a boulder up a hill over and over again, the modern consumer has to work hard in order to earn money and then spend it over and over again.




Singer argues that effective altruism is a way out of the Sisyphus Problem. But why is it that the effective altruist is not faced with the same kind of problem? After all, the effective altruist also has to work hard in order to earn money and then give it away over and over again. As far as the Sisyphus Problem is concerned, why does it matter whether one spends one's money or gives it away?

[PHI 3000] Sabbath on the Problem of Evil

Black Sabbath's new single from their upcoming album 13 is called "God is Dead?"

Although the image of Friedrich Nietzsche appears in this YouTube video, when he said that "God is dead," Nietzsche probably meant that God is no longer relevant to human affairs. But Ozzy is worried about something else. As he said in an interview:

When you think about the tragedy that's happened throughout time, it just came in my head. You'd think by now that their God would have stopped people dying in the name of, so I just starting thinking that people must be thinking, 'Where is God? God is dead' and it just hit me.

So Ozzy is worried about the problem of evil. But he also says this:

At the end of the thing, there's still a bit of hope because there I sing that I don't believe that God is dead. It's just a question of when you see so many dreadful people killing each other with bombs, and blowing the tube trains up and the World Trade Center.

Can hope play an evidential role as far as the question of God's existence is concerned? That is, if evil counts as evidence against the existence of God, could hope count as evidence for?

[PL 211] Dennett's Seven Tools for Thinking

In this excerpt from his Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, Daniel Dennett lists his seven tools for thinking:

1. Use Your Mistakes. Don't be afraid to make mistakes in public as long as you learn from your mistakes.
2. Respect Your Opponent. Apply the principle of charity charitably.
3. The 'Surely' Klaxon. Use of the word 'surely' in argumentative essays is a good indicator of weak points in arguments.
4. Answer Rhetorical Questions. If you can think of unobvious answers to rhetorical questions, then that is an indication of weak points in arguments.
5. Employ Occam's Razor. Give preference to simple theories over complicated ones.
6. Don't Waste Your Time on Rubbish. Don't waste your time on lousy work, of which there is a lot out there.
7. Beware of Deepities. Be mindful of ambiguities. For example:

What do you think of Dennett's seven tools for thinking?

Regarding (1), do you think that one can always learn from one's mistakes?

Regarding (2), do you think that all argumentative opponents deserve respect?

Regarding (3), do you think that 'surely' is a good indicator of argumentative flaws?

Regarding (4), do you think that, if a rhetorical question has an unobvious answer, then that means that the obvious answer is false?

Regarding (5), do you think that simple theories are more likely to be true?

Regarding (6), do you think that considering nonsense is always a waste of time?

Regarding (7), do you think that ambiguity is usually a bad thing in argumentative contexts?

[PL 211] Too cool for proof?

In Jack Reacher, one character says about the protagonist, Jack Reacher, that "He doesn't care about proof. He only cares about what's right."

Does that make sense? Can one "care about what's right" without caring about "proof"? Without "proof," how would one know what's right?

[PL 211] Is Hawking guilty of practical inconsistency?

Following up on my post about Stephen Hawking and his backing of the academic boycott of Israel, here is an interesting question from AskPhilosophers:

Assuming that "If you're going to boycott Israel, please remove the Intel chip that allows you to speak" is meant to be an argument, one interpretation of it is the following:

1. If one is to boycott X, then practical consistency demands a full (as opposed to selective) boycott.
2. Hawking wants to boycott Israel.
3. Therefore, Hawking must boycott everything Israeli (i.e., full boycott as opposed to a selective boycott).

Presumably, those who put forth this kind of argument assume that Hawking will not boycott certain Israeli things, such as the alleged Intel chip that allows him to talk, and thus he is guilty of practical inconsistency. What do you think about this argument? Is it fallacious?

[PHI 3000] Are we stuck in Plato's Cave?

In Plato's Cave analogy (The Republic, Book Seven):

Seated prisoners, chained so that they cannot move their heads, stare at a cave wall on which are projected images. These images are cast from carved figures illuminated by a fire and carried by people on a parapet above and behind the prisoners. A prisoner is loosed from his chains. First he sees the carved images and the fire. Then he is led out of the cave into ‘real’ world. Blinded by the light of the sun, he cannot look at the trees, rocks and animals around him, but instead looks at the shadows and reflections (in water) cast by those objects. As he becomes acclimatized, he turns his gaze to those objects and finally, fully acclimatized, he looks to the source of illumination, the sun itself.

Plato's Cave analogy can be used to illustrate the distinction between appearance and reality. In Plato's Cave, what visually appears to a prisoner is not what is real but rather an image or a shadow of what is real. For example, the prisoners in Plato's Cave have a visual appearance of the one who came back to tell them about the real world as shadowy black. But this is merely an appearance, since the released prisoner is not shadowy black. If this is correct, then one could make the following argument:

1. We can distinguish between appearance and reality only if we can rule out the possibility that we are in Plato's Cave.
2. We cannot rule out the possibility that we are in Plato's Cave.
3. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between appearance and reality.

What do you make of this argument? If (3) is true, can sense perception give us knowledge of the external world?

[PL 211] I am not convinced

According to the Pragmatic Approach, arguments are to be characterized according to their function. For example:

A collection of propositions is an argument if and only if there is a reasoner R who puts forward some of them (the premises) as reasons in support of one of them (the conclusion) in order to rationally persuade an audience of the truth of the conclusion.

Now, if the function of arguments is to rationally persuade an audience, what happens when they fail to rationally persuade an audience? Are they still arguments? And what if there is no audience? What if I jot down my own reasoning for a conclusion in order to see if my reasoning is valid. Is that an argument?

Many textbook examples of arguments are not intended to rationally persuade the readers of the textbook that the conclusion is true. For example:

The purpose of this argument is illustration, not rational persuasion. So, according to the Pragmatic Approach, is it an argument?

[PHI 3000] What can neuroscience tell us about God?

Dr. Andrew Newberg is a pioneer in neuro-theology, an attempt to explain religious experiences in neuro-scientific terms. But what can neuroscience tell us about God? Newberg claims that the experiences of believers are "neurologically real."




The argument, then, seems to run roughly like this:

1. If God experiences are neurologically real, then God is real.
2. God experiences are neurologically real.
3. Therefore, God is real.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?

[PHI 3800] Is science only for scientists?

Laura Snyder credits “The Philosophical Breakfast Club” with changing science in the following ways:

1. Promoting an inductive method
2. Advocating science for the public good
3. Forming new scientific institutions
4. Accepting external funding

An unintended consequence of this "professionalization of science," according to Snyder, is a rift between science and the rest of the world. As Snyder puts it:

Once scientists became members of a professional group, they were slowly walled off from the rest of us. This is the unintended consequence of the revolution that started with our four friends.

Is this a problem? Should science be "for the public" and "not only for scientists"?

[PHI 2200] Fight fire with fire?

According to The Guardian:

Professor Stephen Hawking is backing the academic boycott of Israel by pulling out of a conference hosted by Israeli president Shimon Peres in Jerusalem as a protest at Israel's treatment of Palestinians.

One of the ways in which Palestinians are being mistreated by Israel is collective punishment. For example, according to Amnesty International, Israel uses house demolitions as a form of collective punishment.

Now, if a boycott is a form of collective punishment, too, insofar as innocent people are being punished for the actions of their government, which they may or may not support, are those who support the academic boycott of Israel guilty of being inconsistent? That is, are they protesting the collective punishment of Palestinians by collectively punishing Israeli academics? Or are they fighting fire with fire?