The civilizations of the ancient Near East were based on a way of thinking fundamentally different from the modern scientific outlook. The difference between scientific and mythical thinking is profound. The scientific mind views physical nature as an it—inanimate, impersonal, and governed by universal law. The mythmaking mind of the Near East saw every object in nature as a thou—personified, alive, with an individual will. It saw gods or demons manipulating things. The world was enchanted, imbued with mysterious spirits. […] Live agents were the forces behind natural events.
Now, Neil deGrasse Tyson thinks that Isaac Newton is the greatest physicist in history.
But Newton was engaged in what Perry et al would characterize as "mythical thinking." For example:
So, is the difference between mythical thinking and scientific thinking not as clear-cut as Perry et al claim? Or perhaps we should conclude instead that Newton was not a scientist after all?
science aims at truth about observable aspects of the world, but that science does not aim at truth about unobservable aspects. Acceptance of a theory, according to constructive empiricism, correspondingly differs from acceptance of a theory on the scientific realist view: the constructive empiricist holds that as far as belief is concerned, acceptance of a scientific theory involves only the belief that the theory is empirically adequate.
X is observable if there are circumstances which are such that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it.
For the constructive empiricist, then, microscopic objects and processes that are too small for us to see with the naked eye, such as cells and intracellular process, are unobservable.
Now, instead of the too small, consider the too slow. We cannot observe with the naked eye the growth of plants, for example, not because plants are too small, but because plant growth is a process that occurs too slowly for us to notice. To observe the growth of plants, we need to use technology. In particular, time-lapse photography allows us to capture processes that occur too slowly for us to observe with the naked eye.
For the constructive empiricist, then, are slow processes that we cannot observe with the naked eye unobservable?
Similarly, consider the too fast. We cannot observe with the naked eye the bouncing of raindrops off puddles, for example, not because raindrops are too small, but because this is a process that occurs too fast for us to notice. To observe the bouncing of raindrops off puddles, we need to use technology. In particular, high-speed photography allows us to capture processes that occur too fast for us to observe with the naked eye.
For the constructive empiricist, then, are fast processes that we cannot observe with the naked eye unobservable?
Once a scientific truth emerges from a consensus of experiments and observations it is the way of the world.
Colbert (a philosophy major) responds by raising a philosophical question about the methodology of science:
But is the science in on science?
In other words, even if deGrasse Tyson is right about the way scientific truths are established, one could still ask whether that way of establishing scientific truth is any good. Well, is it?
In 1907, the New York Times published a piece about experiments performed by Dr. Duncan MacDougall which were designed to demonstrate the existence of the soul.
Dr. MacDougall reasoned that, if there is a soul that departs the human body at the time of death, then the body should lose weight at the time of death when the soul departs.
Following up on the previous post about Tania Lombrozo's post over at 13.7 cosmos & culture--"Does science require faith?"--here is another familiar argument that is mentioned in a quote Lombrozo takes from here:
Sometimes, when people say "science requires faith", what they are
trying to get at is the idea that scientists have to rely on assumptions
that they can't prove. For instance, scientists have to assume that
induction works (e.g. that you can generalize about the future laws of
the universe by looking at the past laws). If tomorrow the laws of
physics were suddenly different than they ever were before, science
would be in pretty deep water.
The familiar argument in question is this: Fans of science who rebuke religious people for taking certain things on faith should be aware that scientists, too, must take certain things on faith (e.g., the legitimacy of inductive inference).
Some would have you think that faith and reason are like oil and water. This simply isn't the case. Some of the greatest minds in history have employed faith to advance the frontiers of science. Many of the greatest scientists in history are people with a deep faith, not just in their science, but also in God.
For Buie, then, the fact that some scientists were religious is a reason to think that their faith played a role in their scientific research and that, in turn, is a reason to think that reason (science) requires faith (religion).
What do you make of Buie's argument? Is it any good?
When we put a satellite in orbit around Mars, we have the scientific knowledge that guarantees accuracy and precision in the prediction of its orbit. Achieving a comparable level of certainty about the outcomes of an economy is far dicier. The fact that the discipline of economics hasn’t helped us improve our predictive abilities suggests it is still far from being a science, and may never be.
Even though it "uses quantitative expression in mathematics," Rosenberg and Curtain argue, economics "lacks the most important of science's characteristics — a record of improvement in predictive range and accuracy."
Let's suppose that predictive success is a characteristic of science, as Rosenberg and Curtain argue. What kind of characteristic is predictive success supposed to be? Is it a necessary characteristic such that a theory counts as a scientific theory only if it makes accurate predictions (which is why economics is not a science, according to Rosenberg and Curtain)? Is it a sufficient characteristic such that any theory that makes accurate predictions is a scientific theory? Or is it both necessary and sufficient such that a theory is a scientific theory if and only if it makes accurate predictions?
In other words, which of the following, if any, is true?
Theory T is a scientific theory only if T makes accurate predictions.
If T makes accurate predictions, then T is a scientific theory.
T is a scientific theory if and only if T makes accurate predictions.
To think about these questions, consider the following. Suppose that the following recipe allows us to make fortune cookies that make accurate predictions:
Recipe: 3 eggs white; 3/4 cup white sugar; 1/2 cup butter; 1/4 cup vanilla; 1 cup flour
That is, this recipe allows us to make fortune cookies that make accurate predictions in much the same way that Newtonian mechanics allows us to send satellites into orbit. If we get the ingredients and/or amounts wrong, e.g., if we put 2 instead of 3 eggs, then the fortune cookies would not make accurate predictions, just as if we get the calculations wrong, the satellite would crash rather than go into orbit.
"Your next article will be published in the best philosophy of science journal."
Now, the question is this: does this recipe for making fortune cookies that make accurate predictions meet the condition of predictive success? If so, is this recipe a scientific theory?
If philosophical research is publicly funded, then it should be about topics that the public cares about.
Philosophical research is publicly funded.
Therefore, philosophical research should be about topics that the public cares about.
If Warburton is right about philosophical research, does the same argument apply to research in general? That is, do scientists (and other researchers) also have a duty to pursue research topics that really matter to people? If so, would pursuing research topics that really matter to people be good or bad for science?
Raymond Tallis argues that "Philosophy isn't dead yet." He thinks that "science is in a mess and needs help [from philosophers]." For example, Tallis says that "The attempt to reconcile [fundamental physics'] two big theories, general relativity and quantum mechanics, has stalled for nearly 40 years."
Even if Tallis is right about that, are there good reasons to think that philosophers can succeed where scientists have failed?
Tallis also claims that
The attempt to fit consciousness into the material world, usually by identifying it with activity in the brain, has failed dismally, if only because there is no way of accounting for the fact that certain nerve impulses are supposed to be conscious (of themselves or of the world) while the overwhelming majority (physically essentially the same) are not.
But why think that "physics [needs to] accommodate conscious beings"? Don't we have other scientific disciplines that are supposed to handle the question of consciousness, such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and the like? Why pick on physics? Isn't Tallis complaining that physics cannot do the job it is not supposed to do?
An unintended consequence of this "professionalization of science," according to Snyder, is a rift between science and the rest of the world. As Snyder puts it:
Once scientists became members of a professional group, they were slowly walled off from the rest of us. This is the unintended consequence of the revolution that started with our four friends.
Is this a problem? Should science be "for the public" and "not only for scientists"?
Is Krämer right in limiting philosophy's normative role? That is, do you agree with Krämer that philosophers of science have no business telling scientists "how science should be done"?
The original problem of induction, due to Hume, is the problem of justifying inferences from the known or observed (i.e., that with which we have had experience) to the unknown or unobserved (i.e., that with which we have had no experience). For example:
In my experience, all the New Yorkers I've met so far were rude.
Therefore, in general, all New Yorkers are rude. (Or, the next New Yorker I will meet will be rude.)
This argument is not deductively valid. Perhaps all the New Yorkers I've met were rude, for some reason, but there are New Yorkers out there who are not rude. I just haven't met them yet. We could add the following assumption to the argument in order to make it deductively valid:
(UN) What has happened in the past will continue to happen in the future. (Or, past experience is a sure guide for what will happen in cases that we haven't experienced.)
But then what is the justification for (UN)? (UN) can be justified deductively or inductively. However, no deductive argument can prove (UN) true, since (UN) is a contingent, not a necessary, truth. And no inductive argument can support (UN), since such an argument would be circular, assuming the very thing that it aims to support.
Now, the problem of justifying inductive inferences is supposed to hold for all inductive inferences from the known or observed (i.e., that with which we have
had experience) to the unknown or unobserved (i.e., that with which we
have had no experience). But is there an epistemically relevant difference between inductive inferences from past to future and inductive inference from present to past?
In this NOVA Science Now episode, astronomers draw conclusions about the history of the solar system from meteorites they find on Earth in the present and evolutionary biologists draw conclusions about the evolutionary history of our species from lice they find in our hair in the present.
Should we have more rational confidence in these inductive inference from present evidence (e.g., meteorites and lice) to past (e.g., evolutionary history of the solar system and our species)?
Perhaps. Consider that the past is supposed to be closed, insofar as what has happened has already happened, whereas the future is supposed to be open, insofar as what will happen hasn't already happened. If so, then when we reason inductively from past to future, rather than from present to past, there is simply more that we can get wrong.
If this is correct, then does that mean that we are more likely to get our present-past inductive inferences right than our past-future inductive inferences simply because there is a lot more we can get wrong about the future? And if so, should we have more rational confidence in present-past inductive inference than in past-future inductive inferences?
In Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel argues that "the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False" because it cannot explain the origin of consciousness and morality. Nagel wants to replace the "Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature" with a teleological one. According to Nagel, only a teleological conception
of nature can explain how consciousness and morality came into
being.
Since Nagel's "teleological conception of nature" is supposed to be a new "scientific paradigm," it would be useful to see if it can be tested against the empirical world. So, if Nagel's teleological conception of nature were true, we would expect consciousness and morality to be ubiquitous in nature; otherwise, nature would be an underachiever. But is that what we find in nature? Not at all. Of all the living creatures in nature, only a few are conscious creatures (let alone creatures that have morality). Most of life in nature is non-conscious life: organisms such as plants, fungi, bacteria, and the like.
If this is correct, then does it mean that Nagel's teleological conception of nature is disconfirmed?
If Nagel's teleological conception of nature were true, then most of life would be conscious.
It is not the case that most of life is conscious.
Therefore, Nagel's teleological conception of nature is not true.
Or does it mean that nature is a failure in achieving its own goals?
If Nagel's teleological conception of nature were true, and nature is not an underachiever, then most of life would be conscious.
It is not the case that most of life is conscious.
Therefore, either Nagel's teleological conception of nature is not true or nature is an underachiever.
The Guardian's Mark Vernon gave Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos the Most Despised Science Book of 2012 award. Vernon seems to be assuming that Mind and Cosmos is a science book. But why think that Mind and Cosmos is a science book? Is it simply because it is a book about a scientific theory?
If evolution by natural selection is a scientific doctrine, then the critique of that doctrine, and even of the fundamental assumption on which it's based, is a legitimate part of science as well.
Do you agree? Is it the case that any kind of critique of a scientific theory is "a legitimate part of science"?
According to the fact/value distinction, factual statements about the world are different from value statements about what is good/bad, moral/immoral, just/unjust, etc. And the latter cannot be deduced in any straightforward way from the former.
Now, recently, Sam Harris has argued against the fact/value distinction. For Harris, values are simply one kind of facts: they are facts about the well-being of sentient creatures.
Since it is often thought that science deals with facts and must remain silent about value questions, Harris rejects the fact/value distinction in order to argue that science can answer moral question. His overall argument seems to go something like this:
Moral questions are questions about the well-being of sentient creatures.
Science can answer questions about the well-being of sentient creatures.
Entity realism is the view that under conditions in which one can demonstrate impressive causal knowledge of a putative (unobservable) entity, such as knowledge that facilitates the manipulation of the entity and its use so as to intervene in other phenomena, one has good reason for realism regarding it.
Now, consider the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). The LHC is an accelerator in which particles, such as protons, are accelerated to speeds approaching the speed of light and are smashed together.
Does the LHC provide a good reason to be a realist about sub-atomic particles, such as protons?
An entity realist could argue as follows:
If scientists know how to manipulate phenomena involving theoretical entities, then those entities really do exist.
Using the LHC, physicists know how to accelerate protons to speeds approaching that of light and smash them together.
According to Kuhn, observation is theory-laden. That is to say, observational evidence is not "purely objective." Rather, observational data is infused with the theoretical commitments of those who perform the observations.
The notion that observation is theory-laden can figure in an argument against the "objectivity" of theory choice in science as follows:
Scientists can objectively choose between competing theories only if observational evidence is theory-free.
Observational evidence is not theory-free (it is theory-laden).
(Therefore) Scientists cannot choose objectively between competing theories.
Now, it might seem as if this argument from the theory-ladenness of observation is another weapon that anti-realists can use in order to argue against scientific realism. But is it?
The most prominent form of anti-realism today is probably constructive empiricism. Constructive empiricists claim that the most appropriate attitude to take with respect to what scientific theories say about unobservable entities, events, and processes is agnosticism. In other words, constructive empiricists recommend agnosticism with respect to theoretical entities, such as atoms, genes, and the like. Clearly, the observable/unobservable distinction is a key tenet of constructive empiricism.
Now, are the notion that observation is theory-laden and the observable/unobservable distinction complementary? Or are they in tension? If observation is not theory-free, but is rather laden with theoretical assumptions, can a real observable/unobservable distinction still be drawn?
In Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Conway show how a few scientists raise doubts about scientific findings in order to advance political and economic agendas.
This Frontline program illustrates how this works in the case of climate change:
These merchants of doubt are portrayed as wrongdoers. But what is it exactly that is reprehensible about what they are doing? Are they in the wrong for going against the consensus? Are they in the wrong for holding beliefs that are taken to be false? If these merchants of doubt are indeed motivated by political and economic considerations, then are they doing something wrong as scientists?
If explanatory considerations play an implicit role in inductive inferences, then induction is ultimately dependent on IBE.
Explanatory considerations play an implicit role in inductive inferences.
(Therefore) Induction is ultimately dependent on IBE.
In support of premise (2), consider the following:
All examined pieces of metal conduct electricity.
(Therefore) All pieces of metal conduct electricity.
We infer (2) from (1), the argument goes, because we believe that the best explanation for why examined pieces of metal conduct electricity, whatever it is, means that unexamined pieces of metal conduct electricity, too.
On the other hand, there are those who think that IBE is ultimately dependent on induction because, when we choose the best explanation among competing explanations, we rely on background information that was acquired using inductive reasoning.
If we choose the best explanation among competing explanations based on information obtained by induction, then IBE is ultimately dependent on induction.
We choose the best explanation among competing explanations based on information obtained by induction.
(Therefore) IBE is ultimately dependent on induction.
In support of premise (2), consider the following:
Approximately 9,000 crop circles appeared in Southern England around the end of the 20th century.
The best explanation for (1) is that these crop circles are man-made.
(Therefore) These crop circles are man-made.
We infer (3) from (1) and (2), the argument goes, because our background information tells us that what initially looks like a mysterious or paranormal phenomena usually turns out to be the work of human beings. This information was gained from past experience, which means that it was acquired using induction.
Which argument do you find more convincing? Do you think that IBE ultimately depends on induction or that induction ultimately depends on IBE?
