The argument known as The Problem of Hell purports to show that the traditional conceptions of an omniperfect God (i.e., an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator) and damnation (i.e., eternal suffering in hell as retribution for sin) are incompatible. The argument goes roughly like this:
An omniperfect God would damn a person to hell only if there is a sufficient justification for doing so.
There is no sufficient justification for damning a person to hell.
Therefore, an omniperfect God would not damn anyone to hell.
Premise (1) is true in virtue of the divine attributes. A morally perfect God would not allow unjustified suffering. An omniscient God would know whether any suffering is justified or not. And an omnipotent God would be able to prevent unjustified suffering from occurring.
The key premise, then, is premise (2). Here is an argument for premise (2):
Argument I
The punishment must fit the crime.
Damnation is eternal, whereas a life of crime (or sin) is finite.
Therefore, eternal damnation is not a fitting punishment for a finite life of crime (or sin).
In other words, if the punishment should be proportional to the crime committed, then damnation is clearly not a proportional punishment for a life of crime, since the former is eternal (without beginning or end; lasting forever), whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite suffering in hell cannot be a fitting punishment for a finite life of sin. If this is correct, then there is no sufficient justification for damning someone to hell. In other words, no one deserves to go to hell.
A similar point can be made about heaven. If heaven is supposed to be a deserved reward for a virtuous life, then no one could possibly deserve such a reward.
Argument II
The reward must fit the deed.
Heaven is eternal bliss, whereas a virtuous life is finite.
Therefore, eternal bliss is not a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue.
In other words, if the reward should be proportional to the deed, then heaven is clearly not a proportional reward for a virtuous life, since the former is eternal, whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite bliss in heaven cannot be a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue. If this is correct, then no one deserves to go to heaven.
What do you make of Arguments I and II? Are they sound?
In "Testing the God Hypothesis," the physicist Victor Stenger, claims that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically, in the same way that scientific hypotheses are tested. According to Stenger, any of the following, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis:
Afterlife: "a person who had been declared dead by every means known to science might return to life with detailed stories of an afterlife that were later verified. For example, she might meet Jimmy Hoffa who tells her where to find his body."
Miracles: "Miracles are observed. For example, prayers are answered; an arm or a leg is regenerated through faith healing."
Revelation: "any claim of a revelation obtained during a mystical trance could contain scientifically verifiable information that the subject could not possibly have known."
Moral law: "Natural events might follow some moral law, rather than morally neutral mathematical laws. For example, lightning might strike only the wicked; people who behave badly might fall sick more often; nuns would always survive plane crashes."
If any of these were observed, Stenger argues, they would count as empirical evidence in favor of the God hypothesis.
Do you agree with Stenger that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically? If so, what else, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis?
If, after several tests, no empirical evidence is forthcoming, what should we conclude: that the God hypothesis is probably false or that the existence of God cannot be tested empirically?
The Western conception of God is that of an all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and morally perfect creator. Love is often said to be an essential part of this conception of God.
In the Old and New Testament, God issues the following commands that have to do with love:
If God wants us to love him and each other, which is consistent with the Western conception of God as a morally perfect being, it is rather puzzling that there are people who are incapable of loving others.
Why would God command us to love him and each other and then make some people (e.g., narcissists, psychopaths, etc.) incapable of obeying these commands?
if it seems to me that I have a glimpse of Heaven, or a vision of God, that is grounds for me and others to suppose that I do. And, more generally, the occurrence of religious experiences is prima facie reason for all to believe in that of which the reported experience was purportedly an experience (Swinburne 2004, 310).
Swinburne’s argument is a version of an argument for the existence of God known as the argument from religious experience. Swinburne’s version of the argument is based on a principle he calls the Principle of Credulity. According to the Principle of Credulity, "if it seems (epistemically) to S that x is present, that is good reason for S to believe that x is present" (Swinburne 2004, 310). Swinburne says that the Principle of Credulity is "a principle of rationality," that "what one seems to perceive is probably so" (Swinburne 2004, 303).
Using the Principle of Credulity, then, Swinburne argues roughly as follows:
If it seems (epistemically) to me (Swinburne) that God is present, that is good reason for me to believe that God is present.
It seems (epistemically) to me that God is present.
Therefore, I (Swinburne) have good reason to believe that God is present.
Now, in 1907, the German artist, August Natterer, had an experience which he later described as follows:
I saw a white spot in the clouds absolutely close – all the clouds paused – then the white spot departed and stood all the time like a board in the sky. On the same board or the screen or stage now images as quick as a flash followed each other, about 10,000 in half an hour… God himself occurred, the witch, who created the world – in between worldly visions: images of war, continents, memorials, castles, beautiful castles, just the glory of the world – but all of this to see in supernal images. They were at least twenty meters big, clear to observe, almost without color like photographs… The images were epiphanies of the Last Judgment. Christ couldn't fulfill the salvation because he was crucified early... God revealed them to me to accomplish the salvation.
Based on his experience, is it rational for Natterer to conclude that God is present?
Hexenkopf (The Witch's Head), ca. 1915
If Natterer's experience does not give him (and us) a good reason to believe that God is present, does that mean that the Principle of Credulity is false?
A theodicy is an account that is supposed to show why God is justified in allowing evil in this world. One such account is known as “the punishment theodicy.” According to the punishment theodicy, God allows natural evil (i.e., the pain, suffering, death, and destruction that result from natural processes, such as earthquakes, storms, and the like) as punishment for sin.
Pereboom, 2005, "The Problem of Evil," The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 155.
Now, consider the fact that studies have shown that physical punishment is not effective and is actually harmful to kids. In light of these studies, and given that natural evil is a form of physical punishment (i.e., an action intended to cause physical discomfort or pain to correct behavior), it follows that God is allowing a discipline method that is not only ineffective but also harmful to us. That is:
Natural evil is physical punishment from God. [the punishment theodicy]
Physical punishment is an ineffective and harmful discipline method.
Therefore, God is allowing us to be disciplined in an ineffective and harmful way.
This conclusion, namely, (3), seems to be incompatible with the concept of God as an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent being. Being all-powerful and all-knowing, God could surely come up with effective and harmless ways to discipline us, if he wanted to. Being benevolent, he would want to do just that. And yet, if the punishment theodicy is true, we are being punished by God in ineffective and harmful ways. Does this mean that the punishment theodicy must be false?
In this short paper, Gareth Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker offer what they take to be a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument for the existence of God. They present the argument as a dialogue but it takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum (as St. Anselm's original argument does):
God (i.e., a being than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
If God does not exist, then God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
If God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a being greater than God can be conceived, namely, a being that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
Something greater than God can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
Therefore, God exists.
According to Matthews and Rudder Baker, this is a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument because it avoids the question of whether existence is a predicate. Instead, they argue, this simplified version of the argument appeals to the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers. But why exactly is it "greater" to have unmediated causal powers (and "greater" in what sense)? In other words, why think that premise (3) is true?
More importantly, does this "simplified" version of the Ontological Argument avoid Gaunilo's objection? Gaunilo pointed out that St. Anselm's reasoning can be applied to any thing whatsoever, even things that are clearly imaginary. For example, we can define Pegasus as that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived. Then we can apply the same reasoning to "prove" the existence of Pegasus by simply replacing 'God' with 'Pegasus' thus:
Pegasus (i.e., that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
If Pegasus does not exist, then Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
If Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a winged horse greater than Pegasus can be conceived, namely, a winged horse that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
Something greater than Pegasus can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
Therefore, Pegasus exists.
If this is correct, is the "simplified version of the Ontological Argument" really an improvement upon St. Anselm's original argument?
Judging by his response, Plantinga seems to think that the most important argument for theism is an argument from consensus. That is:
Most people believe that there is a divine being worthy of worship.
Therefore, there is a divine being worthy of worship.
Do you agree with Plantinga that this argument from consensus is the most important argument for theism? Do you find this argument convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
In this interview on the New York Times' The Stone, Alvin Plantinga makes the case for the rationality of theism over atheism. For two points extra credit, pick one of his arguments, analyze it, and evaluate it. Leave your analysis as a comment on this post by 02/18.
According to the argument from fine-tuning, since the fact that our universe is fit for life is so improbable, it must be the work of God (i.e., an all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect creator). One question that came up during class discussion is this: if fine-tuning really is the work of God, would we also expect the universe to be not only fine-tuned for the mere existence of life but also fine-tuned for the preservation of life? After all, being morally perfect, God would want to preserve his creation in existence, and being all-powerful, God would be able to do so.
Following up on the previous post about Tania Lombrozo's post over at 13.7 cosmos & culture--"Does science require faith?"--here is another familiar argument that is mentioned in a quote Lombrozo takes from here:
Sometimes, when people say "science requires faith", what they are
trying to get at is the idea that scientists have to rely on assumptions
that they can't prove. For instance, scientists have to assume that
induction works (e.g. that you can generalize about the future laws of
the universe by looking at the past laws). If tomorrow the laws of
physics were suddenly different than they ever were before, science
would be in pretty deep water.
The familiar argument in question is this: Fans of science who rebuke religious people for taking certain things on faith should be aware that scientists, too, must take certain things on faith (e.g., the legitimacy of inductive inference).
Some would have you think that faith and reason are like oil and water. This simply isn't the case. Some of the greatest minds in history have employed faith to advance the frontiers of science. Many of the greatest scientists in history are people with a deep faith, not just in their science, but also in God.
For Buie, then, the fact that some scientists were religious is a reason to think that their faith played a role in their scientific research and that, in turn, is a reason to think that reason (science) requires faith (religion).
What do you make of Buie's argument? Is it any good?
Why do we circumcise? Why didn't God create us "the right way" both physically and morally? After all, God could have, if he wanted to. God commanded us to circumcise baby boys because he enjoys seeing them improve themselves both physically and morally.
At first glance, there seem to be several problems with this theodicy. First, how does circumcision make one a better person both physically and morally? In what sense is removing the foreskin an "improvement"?
Second, even if God enjoys seeing boys improve themselves both physically and morally, what about girls? After all, girls are not circumcised. Doesn't God enjoy seeing girls become better persons?
Third, this theodicy seems to make God dependent on human beings for his enjoyment. Being perfect in every respect, couldn't God find better ways to entertain himself, without relying on human beings?
Fourth, if God is capable of enjoyment, pleasure, or having a good time, is he also capable of displeasure or having a bad time? If so, feeling displeasure indicates a want or a defect. Does that mean that God lacks something or has some sort of defect?
Finally, taking the Bible as the word of God, the first mention of circumcision in the Torah is in the Book of Genesis 17:9, well after the creation of Adam (Genesis 1:26). Why did it take God so long to realize that his creation can be improved upon?
Black Sabbath's new single from their upcoming album 13 is called "God is Dead?"
Although the image of Friedrich Nietzsche appears in this YouTube video, when he said that "God is dead," Nietzsche probably meant that God is no longer relevant to human affairs. But Ozzy is worried about something else. As he said in an interview:
When you think about the tragedy that's happened throughout time, it just came in my head. You'd think by now that their God would have stopped people dying in the name of, so I just starting thinking that people must be thinking, 'Where is God? God is dead' and it just hit me.
So Ozzy is worried about the problem of evil. But he also says this:
At the end of the thing, there's still a bit of hope because there I sing that I don't believe that God is dead. It's just a question of when you see so many dreadful people killing each other with bombs, and blowing the tube trains up and the World Trade Center.
Can hope play an evidential role as far as the question of God's existence is concerned? That is, if evil counts as evidence against the existence of God, could hope count as evidence for?
Dr. Andrew Newberg is a pioneer in neuro-theology, an attempt to explain religious experiences in neuro-scientific terms. But what can neuroscience tell us about God? Newberg claims that the experiences of believers are "neurologically real."
The argument, then, seems to run roughly like this:
If God experiences are neurologically real, then God is real.
At the end of this segment from the Radiolab podcast, Are You Sure?, Pascal's Wager is mentioned as an example of making decisions based on odds. Pascal's Wager can be represented by the following decision matrix:
Pascal argues that the rational decision is to believe in God. In the podcast, one of the hosts of Radiolab claims that belief in God that is based on odds of "winning" or "losing" is a lesser form of belief; less sincere perhaps, but certainly not as good as belief in God for the "right" reasons.
If so, then, presumably, God would be able to tell the difference between sincere belief for the "right" reasons and belief for personal gain, since God is supposed to be all-knowing.
If this is correct, then is belief in God still the rational decision to make, as Pascal argues? And even if one decides to believe, is that going to do one any good (in terms of winning the "jackpot")?
If one considers the history of scientific theories in any given discipline, what one typically finds is a regular turnover of older theories in favour of newer ones, as scientific knowledge develops. From the point of view of the present, most past theories must be considered false; indeed, this will be true from the point of view of most times. Therefore, by enumerative induction (that is, generalizing from these cases), surely theories at any given time will ultimately be replaced and regarded as false from some future perspective. Thus, current theories are also false.
Now, consider the following argument, which is also an inductive generalization from cases, only this time the cases are arguments for the existence of God rather than scientific theories:
Past arguments for the existence of God have turned out to be fallacious.
Therefore, current arguments for the existence of God are also fallacious.
What do you make of this inductive generalization? Is it cogent?
Is Stewart right about the difference between philosophy and religion? Suppose that, after his death, Socrates is also revered and worshiped as a god. Would Socratism then be a religion?
