It is often said that the notion of free will is incompatible with causal determinism, namely, "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature." But the notion of free will may also be incompatible with classical logic (more specifically, the principle of bivalence according to which, for any proposition p, either p is true or p is false), as Aristotle's discussion of the problem of future contingents suggests.
Consider the following proposition:
Neo will choose the red pill.
On the one hand, if (1) is true, then Neo will choose the red pill and there is nothing he can do about it. On the other hand, if (1) is false, then it is not the case that Neo will choose the red pill and, again, there is nothing he can do about it. Either way, Neo cannot help but choose the red pill if (1) is true, or not choose the red pill if (1) is false, which means that Neo cannot choose freely.
What do you make of this argument? Does it show that the notion of free will is incompatible with classical logic (specifically, the principle of bivalence)? If so, which, if any, should we give up?
The argument known as The Problem of Hell purports to show that the traditional conceptions of an omniperfect God (i.e., an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator) and damnation (i.e., eternal suffering in hell as retribution for sin) are incompatible. The argument goes roughly like this:
An omniperfect God would damn a person to hell only if there is a sufficient justification for doing so.
There is no sufficient justification for damning a person to hell.
Therefore, an omniperfect God would not damn anyone to hell.
Premise (1) is true in virtue of the divine attributes. A morally perfect God would not allow unjustified suffering. An omniscient God would know whether any suffering is justified or not. And an omnipotent God would be able to prevent unjustified suffering from occurring.
The key premise, then, is premise (2). Here is an argument for premise (2):
Argument I
The punishment must fit the crime.
Damnation is eternal, whereas a life of crime (or sin) is finite.
Therefore, eternal damnation is not a fitting punishment for a finite life of crime (or sin).
In other words, if the punishment should be proportional to the crime committed, then damnation is clearly not a proportional punishment for a life of crime, since the former is eternal (without beginning or end; lasting forever), whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite suffering in hell cannot be a fitting punishment for a finite life of sin. If this is correct, then there is no sufficient justification for damning someone to hell. In other words, no one deserves to go to hell.
A similar point can be made about heaven. If heaven is supposed to be a deserved reward for a virtuous life, then no one could possibly deserve such a reward.
Argument II
The reward must fit the deed.
Heaven is eternal bliss, whereas a virtuous life is finite.
Therefore, eternal bliss is not a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue.
In other words, if the reward should be proportional to the deed, then heaven is clearly not a proportional reward for a virtuous life, since the former is eternal, whereas the latter is not. An infinite quantity cannot be proportional to a finite quantity, which means that infinite bliss in heaven cannot be a fitting reward for a finite life of virtue. If this is correct, then no one deserves to go to heaven.
What do you make of Arguments I and II? Are they sound?
In "Testing the God Hypothesis," the physicist Victor Stenger, claims that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically, in the same way that scientific hypotheses are tested. According to Stenger, any of the following, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis:
Afterlife: "a person who had been declared dead by every means known to science might return to life with detailed stories of an afterlife that were later verified. For example, she might meet Jimmy Hoffa who tells her where to find his body."
Miracles: "Miracles are observed. For example, prayers are answered; an arm or a leg is regenerated through faith healing."
Revelation: "any claim of a revelation obtained during a mystical trance could contain scientifically verifiable information that the subject could not possibly have known."
Moral law: "Natural events might follow some moral law, rather than morally neutral mathematical laws. For example, lightning might strike only the wicked; people who behave badly might fall sick more often; nuns would always survive plane crashes."
If any of these were observed, Stenger argues, they would count as empirical evidence in favor of the God hypothesis.
Do you agree with Stenger that the belief in the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator of the universe should be treated as a hypothesis that can be tested empirically? If so, what else, if observed, would count as empirical evidence for the God hypothesis?
If, after several tests, no empirical evidence is forthcoming, what should we conclude: that the God hypothesis is probably false or that the existence of God cannot be tested empirically?
The Western conception of God is that of an all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and morally perfect creator. Love is often said to be an essential part of this conception of God.
In the Old and New Testament, God issues the following commands that have to do with love:
If God wants us to love him and each other, which is consistent with the Western conception of God as a morally perfect being, it is rather puzzling that there are people who are incapable of loving others.
Why would God command us to love him and each other and then make some people (e.g., narcissists, psychopaths, etc.) incapable of obeying these commands?
if it seems to me that I have a glimpse of Heaven, or a vision of God, that is grounds for me and others to suppose that I do. And, more generally, the occurrence of religious experiences is prima facie reason for all to believe in that of which the reported experience was purportedly an experience (Swinburne 2004, 310).
Swinburne’s argument is a version of an argument for the existence of God known as the argument from religious experience. Swinburne’s version of the argument is based on a principle he calls the Principle of Credulity. According to the Principle of Credulity, "if it seems (epistemically) to S that x is present, that is good reason for S to believe that x is present" (Swinburne 2004, 310). Swinburne says that the Principle of Credulity is "a principle of rationality," that "what one seems to perceive is probably so" (Swinburne 2004, 303).
Using the Principle of Credulity, then, Swinburne argues roughly as follows:
If it seems (epistemically) to me (Swinburne) that God is present, that is good reason for me to believe that God is present.
It seems (epistemically) to me that God is present.
Therefore, I (Swinburne) have good reason to believe that God is present.
Now, in 1907, the German artist, August Natterer, had an experience which he later described as follows:
I saw a white spot in the clouds absolutely close – all the clouds paused – then the white spot departed and stood all the time like a board in the sky. On the same board or the screen or stage now images as quick as a flash followed each other, about 10,000 in half an hour… God himself occurred, the witch, who created the world – in between worldly visions: images of war, continents, memorials, castles, beautiful castles, just the glory of the world – but all of this to see in supernal images. They were at least twenty meters big, clear to observe, almost without color like photographs… The images were epiphanies of the Last Judgment. Christ couldn't fulfill the salvation because he was crucified early... God revealed them to me to accomplish the salvation.
Based on his experience, is it rational for Natterer to conclude that God is present?
Hexenkopf (The Witch's Head), ca. 1915
If Natterer's experience does not give him (and us) a good reason to believe that God is present, does that mean that the Principle of Credulity is false?
The report says that Lanza's mental health problems included "autism, anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and suicidal disorder." The report also says that his mother made his condition worse by refusing medical treatment, keeping him at home, and not restricting his access to guns.
All of the above notwithstanding, the report concludes that "In the end, only [Lanza], and [Lanza] alone, bears responsibility for this monstrous act." But why? Why think that Lanza is responsible (i.e., that he is worthy of blame or that he deserves punishment) for the shooting despite the numerous mental health problems he suffered from?
Is this feeling of control or "up-to-me-ness" (Caruso 2012, p. 188) a feeling that most (maybe even all) people share? If it is, should we expect most people to feel that they are in control of their lives?
Suppose we find out that most people feel that their lives are fragile (see YouTube video), would the following argument be sound?
If people feel that they are in control, then they will not feel that their lives are fragile.
People do feel that their lives are fragile.
Therefore, it is not the case that people feel that they are in control.
Suppose we find out that most people feel that their dreams have been shattered (see YouTube video), would the following argument be sound?
If free will were real, then people would not feel that their dreams have been shattered.
People do feel that their dreams have been shattered.
In this episode of Tales from the Crypt, Carlton undergoes a gradual transformation at the end of which his old body is replaced with the body of a young man.
At the end of the switch, is Carlton still Carlton?
And who is Carlton: the one with the old body or the one with the young body?
More precisely, he claims that what philosophers call "qualia" (AKA the "subjective character of experience," the "what it is like," or "phenomenal properties") is an illusion. It is an illusion, according to Frankish, insofar as qualia or phenomenal properties merely seem to be non-physical but are not really non-physical.
What is Frankish's argument for the claim that qualia are illusory? Is it a good argument?
If the mental (or mind) and the physical (or the body/brain) "are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing," as dualism says, and what characterizes creatures that have a mind is the ability to think, then we should expect that purely physical things, like machines, would not be able to think.
Watson is able to answer Jeopardy questions by testing hypotheses. If that counts as thinking, then the following argument against mind-body dualism can be made:
If the mental (mind) and the physical (body) are radically different kinds of thing, then machines cannot think.
Machines can think (e.g., Watson).
Therefore, it is not the case that the mental (mind) and the physical (body) are radically different kinds of thing.
A theodicy is an account that is supposed to show why God is justified in allowing evil in this world. One such account is known as “the punishment theodicy.” According to the punishment theodicy, God allows natural evil (i.e., the pain, suffering, death, and destruction that result from natural processes, such as earthquakes, storms, and the like) as punishment for sin.
Pereboom, 2005, "The Problem of Evil," The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 155.
Now, consider the fact that studies have shown that physical punishment is not effective and is actually harmful to kids. In light of these studies, and given that natural evil is a form of physical punishment (i.e., an action intended to cause physical discomfort or pain to correct behavior), it follows that God is allowing a discipline method that is not only ineffective but also harmful to us. That is:
Natural evil is physical punishment from God. [the punishment theodicy]
Physical punishment is an ineffective and harmful discipline method.
Therefore, God is allowing us to be disciplined in an ineffective and harmful way.
This conclusion, namely, (3), seems to be incompatible with the concept of God as an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent being. Being all-powerful and all-knowing, God could surely come up with effective and harmless ways to discipline us, if he wanted to. Being benevolent, he would want to do just that. And yet, if the punishment theodicy is true, we are being punished by God in ineffective and harmful ways. Does this mean that the punishment theodicy must be false?
In this short paper, Gareth Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker offer what they take to be a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument for the existence of God. They present the argument as a dialogue but it takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum (as St. Anselm's original argument does):
God (i.e., a being than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
If God does not exist, then God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
If God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a being greater than God can be conceived, namely, a being that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
Something greater than God can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
Therefore, God exists.
According to Matthews and Rudder Baker, this is a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument because it avoids the question of whether existence is a predicate. Instead, they argue, this simplified version of the argument appeals to the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers. But why exactly is it "greater" to have unmediated causal powers (and "greater" in what sense)? In other words, why think that premise (3) is true?
More importantly, does this "simplified" version of the Ontological Argument avoid Gaunilo's objection? Gaunilo pointed out that St. Anselm's reasoning can be applied to any thing whatsoever, even things that are clearly imaginary. For example, we can define Pegasus as that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived. Then we can apply the same reasoning to "prove" the existence of Pegasus by simply replacing 'God' with 'Pegasus' thus:
Pegasus (i.e., that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
If Pegasus does not exist, then Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
If Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a winged horse greater than Pegasus can be conceived, namely, a winged horse that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
Something greater than Pegasus can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
Therefore, Pegasus exists.
If this is correct, is the "simplified version of the Ontological Argument" really an improvement upon St. Anselm's original argument?
Judging by his response, Plantinga seems to think that the most important argument for theism is an argument from consensus. That is:
Most people believe that there is a divine being worthy of worship.
Therefore, there is a divine being worthy of worship.
Do you agree with Plantinga that this argument from consensus is the most important argument for theism? Do you find this argument convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
Today we discussed the "sheep in the meadow" case. Some of my students judged that S does not know that there's a sheep in the meadow. Their reasoning went something like this:
S sees a rock that, to S, looks like a sheep from a distance. S is not justified in believing that there's a sheep in the meadow because S hasn't done enough to be justified in so believing. After all, S sees the rock that looks like a sheep from a distance. So there is a lot more that S can do in order to be justified in believing that there's a sheep in the meadow. For instance, S can get closer to the rock that looks like a sheep. S can ask other onlookers: "Does that look like a sheep to you?" As long as S relies solely on what S sees from a distance and does not do more to corroborate the belief that there's a sheep in the meadow, S is not justified in believing that there's a sheep in the meadow.
In this interview on the New York Times' The Stone, Alvin Plantinga makes the case for the rationality of theism over atheism. For two points extra credit, pick one of his arguments, analyze it, and evaluate it. Leave your analysis as a comment on this post by 02/18.
Free will is supposed to be our ability to "choose a course of action from various alternatives" and how we choose is supposed to be up to us. Some argue that we have free will only if the causal factors that determine our actions are up to us. Since those causal factors are beyond our control, we do not act freely.
Now, instead of thinking of these causal factors (e.g., genes and environment) as factors that causally determine our actions, think of them as prerequisites or preconditions for free will. After all, in order to act freely, it seems that one needs a healthy brain, at the very least, as cases of severe brain injuries show.
Moreover, it seems that children born with Tay Sachs disease or microcephaly cannot be said to be acting freely (i.e., rationally choosing a course of action from various alternatives in full control) in any meaningful way.
If this is correct, then free will itself is causally determined. That is, whether one can act freely or not is causally determined by factors that are beyond one's control. More explicitly:
The preconditions for free will (e.g., a healthy brain) are causally determined by factors over which we have no control (e.g., genes).
If the preconditions for free will are causally determined by factors over which we have no control, then whether we have free will or not is not up to us.
Therefore, whether we have free will or not is not up to us.
In other words, even if we can act freely, we cannot act freely freely. That is, since one needs a healthy brain (at the very least) in order to act freely, and whether one is born with a healthy brain or not is not up to one, then whether one can act freely or not is not up to one. Is this argument sound?
If it is, then the problem of moral responsibility remains. That is, even if we can act freely, our ability to act freely is itself causally determined by factors beyond our control. But if our free will is not free, are we ultimately responsible for what we do, even if we do it freely?
According to the argument from fine-tuning, since the fact that our universe is fit for life is so improbable, it must be the work of God (i.e., an all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect creator). One question that came up during class discussion is this: if fine-tuning really is the work of God, would we also expect the universe to be not only fine-tuned for the mere existence of life but also fine-tuned for the preservation of life? After all, being morally perfect, God would want to preserve his creation in existence, and being all-powerful, God would be able to do so.
When I discuss the problem of evil and the free will defense with my students, the following idea usually comes up: "true" free will means being able to choose between good and evil. That is, if God were to take away people's ability to choose between doing good and doing evil, he would be taking away their free will.
To examine this idea, consider the following question: Can one act freely in heaven?
On the one hand, given that heaven is supposed to be devoid of all evil, and assuming that free will essentially means choosing between doing good and doing evil, it seems that we would have to say that there is no free will in heaven, either, since one cannot choose evil in heaven. On the other hand, if we want to say that one can act freely in heaven, then it seems that we would have to abandon the idea that acting freely essentially means choosing between doing good and doing evil. That is, heaven is supposed to be where one can act freely but there is no evil. If that is the case, however, then why didn't God make this world more like heaven? That is, God could have made this world devoid of evil but with moral agents that can act freely. Why didn't he?
Clive Wearing suffers from chronic anterograde and retrograde amnesia. That means that he cannot form new memories and he cannot access memories formed prior to the onset of his amnesia.
Is Clive Wearing now identical to Clive Wearing from 10 minutes ago? If not, does that show that personal identity does not consist in continuity of memory? If Clive Wearing now and Clive Wearing from 10 minutes ago are identical, what makes them identical?
personal
identity consists in memory; sameness of episodic memory is
metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of persons.
In other words, on the Memory Theory, what makes a person
identical with herself over time is her remembering or being able to
remember the events to which she was witness or agent. If she
cannot episodically remember an event, then she is not identical with
any of the persons who was witness or agent to the event. In such
a case, she would bear the same relation to that event as any other
person for whom a memory of the event could rise at best to the level
of a semantic memory. If she can episodically remember an event,
then her recollection or ability to recall that event makes her
identical with the person represented in that memory as agent or
witness to the event.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Memory Theory is true, i.e., that personal identity consists in memory.
Suppose further that we extract the memories of one person, A, and make exact copies of A's memories. Then, using Rekall's machine, we implant these exact copies of A's memories in B, C, and D. Now, since A, B, C, and D all remember the same things, e.g., they all remember watching the horrible 2012 remake of Total Recall last weekend, does it follow that they are all the same person? If not, does that mean that personal identity does not consist in memory? More explicitly:
Suppose that personal identity consists in memory.
If personal identity consists in memory, then A, B, C, and D are all the same person.
But A, B, C, and D, cannot all be the same person.
Therefore, it is not the case that personal identity consists in memory.
