personal identity consists in memory; sameness of episodic memory is metaphysically necessary and sufficient for sameness of persons. In other words, on the Memory Theory, what makes a person identical with herself over time is her remembering or being able to remember the events to which she was witness or agent. If she cannot episodically remember an event, then she is not identical with any of the persons who was witness or agent to the event. In such a case, she would bear the same relation to that event as any other person for whom a memory of the event could rise at best to the level of a semantic memory. If she can episodically remember an event, then her recollection or ability to recall that event makes her identical with the person represented in that memory as agent or witness to the event.Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Memory Theory is true, i.e., that personal identity consists in memory.
Suppose further that we extract the memories of one person, A, and make exact copies of A's memories. Then, using Rekall's machine, we implant these exact copies of A's memories in B, C, and D. Now, since A, B, C, and D all remember the same things, e.g., they all remember watching the horrible 2012 remake of Total Recall last weekend, does it follow that they are all the same person? If not, does that mean that personal identity does not consist in memory? More explicitly:
- Suppose that personal identity consists in memory.
- If personal identity consists in memory, then A, B, C, and D are all the same person.
- But A, B, C, and D, cannot all be the same person.
- Therefore, it is not the case that personal identity consists in memory.
I strongly agree with this deductive argument because the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Even if we assume the Memory Theory for the sake of the argument, the reduction indicates how it contradicts itself and shows that personal identity does not consist in memory.
ReplyDeleteAccording to the Memory Theory, personal identity consists in memory. In that case, A, B, C and D are all the same person because they all have the same, exact memories and because personal identity consists in memory. However, A, B, C and D are all quantitatively different persons (even if qualitatively the same according to the Memory Theory or Premise 1) and therefore they cannot all be the same person. Hence, it is concluded that personal identity does not consist in memory.
Contradictory to the Memory Theory, I think that personal identity does not consist in memory, but consists of memory. The difference is that personal identity is not part of memory (or is not determined solely by memory), but in fact memory is part of personal identity. Personal identity cannot just be determined by one’s memories because if that were the case, then all patients that recover from coma but have forgotten their memories would be a different person than who they were before the coma. However, that is not the case because the person is still essentially the same, with the difference being that they cannot recall their memories or part of their memories. It may mean that the person recovering from coma changes (due to the lack of a part of their memory/their entire memory), but it does not mean that the person is now a new person (considering the person as new would contradict the Continuous Space-Time Theory).
Personal identity consists of many different components, one of the major ones being one’s memories and how they’ve changed or been affected by them. Other components of personal identity may include personality and upbringing amongst other controversial ones.
Though I agree with the reductio, I think an argument can be made against it. One who believes that personal identity consists in memory might question the third premise. They could argue that A, B, C, and D are all the same person. They might believe that B, C, and D are copies of A because they share the same memories, and are therefore identical. They might also say that A, B, C, and D are all identical initially, but as soon as they build upon their memories and have new experiences, they will all become distinct and their identities will separate from each other. To me, it does not make sense that personal identity lies in memory because our memories are constantly changing. With every new experience/memory we would become new people. I am the same person I was 5 years ago, but I have different memories than I did 5 years ago, therefore, my identity does not consist in my memory.
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