[PHI 2200] Was Kant a hypocrite?

Immanuel Kant is one of the dominant figures in the history of philosophy, particularly moral philosophy. Kant's ethics, also known as deontological ethics, is one of the three main theoretical approaches to normative ethics to this day (deontology, consequentialism, and virtue theory).

At the core of Kant’s moral philosophy is the notion of human dignity. As the second formula of the Categorical Imperative (AKA, the Humanity Formula) states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." Human beings must be treated as ends, not as means to an end, because they are rational agents. The source of our dignity and worth, according to Kant, is the fact that we are free rational agents who are the legislators of our own moral laws.

Unfortunately, it appears that Kant himself was a racist.

If Kant didn't think that all human beings are equal in dignity, does that mean that he was a hypocrite? If Kant was indeed a racist, does that undermine his notion of human dignity? Should we dismiss his moral philosophy because he could not live up to his own standards? [Similar questions can be raised about David Hume.]

[PHI 1000] "I could read it but I don't believe it"

Some members of the House of Representatives' Committee on Science, Space, and Technology appear to mistrust scientists and what they say about climate change, as seen in this clip from The Daily Show.

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For example, Rep. Larry Bucshon says the following:

All the climatologists whose careers depend on the climate changing to keep themselves publishing articles ... I could read [the scientific literature on climate change] but I don't believe it.

Is this a good reason to mistrust what scientists say about climate change?

[PHI 1000] On Bats and Americans

In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," Thomas Nagel says the following:

The argument here seems to go roughly like this:

1. Facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are subjective.
2. Facts about the neuro-physiology of the experiencing organism are objective.
3. Therefore, facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are not facts about the neuro-physiology of that organism.

Is this a valid argument? Nagel's argument seems to take the following form:

X has property F.

Y has property G.

∴ X is not Y.

Now consider the following substitution instance:

1. Americans are most likely to say that global warming is exaggerated.
2. Americans are more worried about the economy than climate change.
3. Therefore, Americans are not Americans.

Of course, it would be question-begging to say that the difference between Nagel's argument and this one is that Americans are Americans, whereas facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism are not facts about the neuro-physiology of that organism, for that is precisely what Nagel's argument purports to prove.

So, if the argument about Americans is invalid, does that mean that Nagel’s argument is invalid as well?

[PHI 3800] Is the science in on science?

In this interview on The Colbert Report, Neil deGrasse Tyson talks about how scientific truths are established.

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According to deGrasse Tyson:

Once a scientific truth emerges from a consensus of experiments and observations it is the way of the world.

Colbert (a philosophy major) responds by raising a philosophical question about the methodology of science:

But is the science in on science?

In other words, even if deGrasse Tyson is right about the way scientific truths are established, one could still ask whether that way of establishing scientific truth is any good. Well, is it?

[PHI 3000] Can we learn from works of fiction?

Epistemologists generally agree that the objects of propositional knowledge are true propositions. That is, if one knows that p, then p is true. To put it another way, propositional knowledge (knowing that) is supposed to be factive.

Now consider how we sometimes say that we learn (i.e., gain propositional knowledge) from works of fiction, such as novels and films. For example, from reading or watching Requiem for a Dream, we can learn something about drug addiction.

In this review of the film, the reviewer seems to suggest that Requiem for a Dream teaches us facts about addiction. But how can that be? After all, Requiem for a Dream is entirely fictional. How can we learn facts about addiction from a fictional film or novel? If knowledge is factive, how can we learn facts from non-facts?

[PHI 3000] Is Atheism Irrational?

In this interview on the New York Times' The Stone, Alvin Plantinga makes the case for the rationality of theism over atheism. For two points extra credit, pick one of his arguments, analyze it, and evaluate it. Leave your analysis as a comment on this post by 02/18.

[PHI 1000] He said she said

In On Bullshit, Frankfurt distinguishes between bullshitting and lying.

According to Frankfurt, bullshit is speech that doesn't show a proper concern for the truth. Lying, on the other hand, consists in thinking that one knows the truth and then saying something else.

Now, consider how, despite video footage to the contrary, Ted Cruz says that he opposed a government shutdown:

I said we shouldn't shut the government down. (See from 2:30 to 3:45 in the video clip from The Daily Show below.)

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Is this a lie or bullshit in the technical sense?

[PHI 3800] Look who's talking about faith

Following up on the previous post about Tania Lombrozo's post over at 13.7 cosmos & culture--"Does science require faith?"--here is another familiar argument that is mentioned in a quote Lombrozo takes from here:

Sometimes, when people say "science requires faith", what they are trying to get at is the idea that scientists have to rely on assumptions that they can't prove. For instance, scientists have to assume that induction works (e.g. that you can generalize about the future laws of the universe by looking at the past laws). If tomorrow the laws of physics were suddenly different than they ever were before, science would be in pretty deep water.

The familiar argument in question is this: Fans of science who rebuke religious people for taking certain things on faith should be aware that scientists, too, must take certain things on faith (e.g., the legitimacy of inductive inference).

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Is this a good argument or an instance of a fallacious tu quoque?

[PHI 1000] What's the difference between a job and a career?

When I ask students why they go to college, I sometimes get the following answer: "Because I want a career, not just a job." But what is the difference between a job and a career?

According to the dictionary (via Google), a job is "a paid position of regular employment," whereas a career is "an occupation undertaken for a significant portion of a person's life and with opportunities for progress."

According to these definitions, then, a position as a cashier at McDonald's could qualify as a career if it is held long enough and has opportunities for progress (e.g., a promotion to manager). Most of my students, however, do not think that a position as a cashier at McDonald's counts as a career.

So what is the difference between a job and a career? Or, in philosophical lingo, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for career as opposed to job?

[PHI 1000] Paradigm Case Arguments

Philosophers sometimes use a strategy of argumentation known as the "Paradigm Case Argument" (PCA). The PCA looks roughly like this:

1. X is a paradigm case of Y.
2. Therefore, Y.

For example:

Since the meaning of 'of his own free-will' can be taught by reference to such paradigm cases as that in which a man, under no social pressures, marries the girl he wants to marry (how else could it be taught?): it cannot be right, on any grounds whatsoever, to say that no one ever acts of his own free will (Flew, 1956, "Philosophy and Language," in Essays in Conceptual Analysis. London, p. 19).

More explicitly:

1. The act of getting married is a paradigm case of acting of one’s own free will.
2. Therefore, one can act of one’s own free will.

Is PCA a compelling argumentative strategy? Suppose that you are a skeptic about free will. Would this paradigm-case argument for free will persuade you? If so, why? If not, why not?

[PHI 3000] You never know just how you look through other people's eyes

The paradox of knowability has been used to show that not all truths are knowable. More specifically:

The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to argue against versions of anti-realism committed to the thesis that all truths are knowable. For clearly there are unknown truths; individually and collectively we are non-omniscient. So, by the main result, it is false that all truths are knowable.

Are there in fact truths that cannot be known, even in principle?

Consider the following:

(UT) Through this person's eyes, I look like that.

[that is used as a placeholder for the way I look to this person]

Can I know that (UT) is true? As far as I'm concerned, is (UT) knowable? Or are the Butthole Surfers right?

[PHI 2200] God Bless America

In God Bless America, Fred is sick and tired of the ills of American society and sets out to rid it from its rude, obnoxious, and otherwise depraved citizens.

Is Fred being inconsistent in wanting to rid society of its morally corrupt while doing so in a morally questionable way (i.e., mass murder)? Or is there a way to square Fred's beliefs with his actions?

[PHI 3000] The Flavor Philosopher

According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, to contemplate is "to view or consider with continued attention : meditate on."

Does it make sense to say that natural flavors--like those of cheese--are the object of contemplation?

[PL 211] What if cancer got cancer?

Can a disease get a disease?

Or is that a category mistake?

[PL 211] Who is Edward Snowden? Does it matter?

In the wake of the NSA surveillance controversy, the media has focused mostly on Edward Snowden and has revealed personal details about his life, education, girlfriend, etc.

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Is this an ad hominem attack on Snowden? Or are these details relevant to assessing his credibility and his testimony?

[PL 211] The nothing-to-hide argument

In the wake of the NSA wiretapping controversy, some have argued as follows:

If you have nothing to hide, then you should not worry about the NSA surveillance program. If you do have something to hide, then you don't deserve to keep it private.

Is this a good argument?

[PL 211] Ockham's Broom and Appeals to Expertise

In this Science Weekly podcast (starting from 21:38), Daniel Dennett talks about his book, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. At one point, Dennett mentions "Ockham's Broom." Coined by Sydney Brenner, the term refers to sweeping under the carpet inconvenient facts (i.e., facts the undermine the claim one argues for).

The problem is that, as Dennett says, only experts can identify when Ockham's Broom has been used. Novices or non-experts will not be able to tell that inconvenient facts are missing from an argument for or against a certain claim.

If that is the case, however, then should novices rely epistemically on experts? That is, if non-experts cannot tell when an expert is using Ockham's Broom in order to make an argument look more convincing than it actually is, how much trust (if at all) should they put in what the expert says?

[PL 211] Appeals to Bizarro Authority

Arguments from Authority (or appeals to authority) are non-deductive arguments from premises about an expert who asserts that p to a conclusion that p is likely true, probable, or worthy of acceptance. More explicitly:

1. Expert E says that p.
2. Therefore, p.

Now, consider arguments from anti-authority or appeals to bizarro authority. Such arguments go as follows:

1. Non-expert B says that p.
2. Therefore, not-p.

For example, Axel Meyer argues that "Philosophical Dadaism a la Feyerabend will not help you get your next paper published." In response, Massimo Pigliucci says the following:

In effect, Pigliucci seems to be arguing that Meyer must be wrong because he is not a philosopher. That is:

1. Non-philosopher Meyer says that p.
2. Therefore, not-p.

Is this a good argument? Is the appeal to bizarro authority a good form of argument in general? If we accept appeals to authority as good arguments, do we have to accept appeals to bizarro authority as well? 

[PL 211] Dennett's Seven Tools for Thinking

In this excerpt from his Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, Daniel Dennett lists his seven tools for thinking:

1. Use Your Mistakes. Don't be afraid to make mistakes in public as long as you learn from your mistakes.
2. Respect Your Opponent. Apply the principle of charity charitably.
3. The 'Surely' Klaxon. Use of the word 'surely' in argumentative essays is a good indicator of weak points in arguments.
4. Answer Rhetorical Questions. If you can think of unobvious answers to rhetorical questions, then that is an indication of weak points in arguments.
5. Employ Occam's Razor. Give preference to simple theories over complicated ones.
6. Don't Waste Your Time on Rubbish. Don't waste your time on lousy work, of which there is a lot out there.
7. Beware of Deepities. Be mindful of ambiguities. For example:

What do you think of Dennett's seven tools for thinking?

Regarding (1), do you think that one can always learn from one's mistakes?

Regarding (2), do you think that all argumentative opponents deserve respect?

Regarding (3), do you think that 'surely' is a good indicator of argumentative flaws?

Regarding (4), do you think that, if a rhetorical question has an unobvious answer, then that means that the obvious answer is false?

Regarding (5), do you think that simple theories are more likely to be true?

Regarding (6), do you think that considering nonsense is always a waste of time?

Regarding (7), do you think that ambiguity is usually a bad thing in argumentative contexts?

[PL 211] Too cool for proof?

In Jack Reacher, one character says about the protagonist, Jack Reacher, that "He doesn't care about proof. He only cares about what's right."

Does that make sense? Can one "care about what's right" without caring about "proof"? Without "proof," how would one know what's right?