[PHI 2200] Was Kant a hypocrite?

Immanuel Kant is one of the dominant figures in the history of philosophy, particularly moral philosophy. Kant's ethics, also known as deontological ethics, is one of the three main theoretical approaches to normative ethics to this day (deontology, consequentialism, and virtue theory).

At the core of Kant’s moral philosophy is the notion of human dignity. As the second formula of the Categorical Imperative (AKA, the Humanity Formula) states: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." Human beings must be treated as ends, not as means to an end, because they are rational agents. The source of our dignity and worth, according to Kant, is the fact that we are free rational agents who are the legislators of our own moral laws.

Unfortunately, it appears that Kant himself was a racist.

If Kant didn't think that all human beings are equal in dignity, does that mean that he was a hypocrite? If Kant was indeed a racist, does that undermine his notion of human dignity? Should we dismiss his moral philosophy because he could not live up to his own standards? [Similar questions can be raised about David Hume.]

[PHI 2200] Do we have an obligation to resist oppression?

According to Carol Hay, we can say what makes sexual harassment morally wrong by appealing to Kant's ethical theory, in particular, to what Kant says about our duty to respect the dignity of others and our own, given that we are rational beings. As Hay writes:

Because we have an obligation to prevent harms to our rational nature, and because oppression can harm our capacity to act rationally, we have an obligation to resist our own oppression. Despite what Kant himself might've thought, we know that women's rational capacities are no different from men's. Thus we can use Kantianism to explain why women are just as deserving of respect as men and why this respect is incompatible with sexist oppression.

Her argument can be reconstructed as follows:

1. We have an obligation to resist attempts to hinder our capacity to act rationally.
2. Sexual harassment (sexist oppression) is an attempt to hinder women's capacity to act rationally.
3. Therefore, women have an obligation to resist sexist oppression.

Do you think that Hay's argument can be extended to other forms of oppression as well?

For example, could one argue from Hay's premises that the poor have an obligation to resist economic oppression?

[PHI 2200] Can excessive wealth and inequality be justified?

According to Oxfam, "Extreme Wealth and Inequality is unethical."

Gandhi famously said "Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed." From an ethical point of view, it is extremely difficult to justify excessive wealth and inequality. In fact, most philosophers and all of the major religions caution against the pursuit of excessive wealth at all cost and prescribe sharing of income with less fortunate members of the community. For instance, the Koran bans usury and says that the rich should give away a portion of their money. The decision of Bill Gates and Warren Buffet to give away their fortunes or to call for greater taxation of excess wealth is an example to the rest of the world's billionaires.

Is there a moral justification for excessive wealth and inequality?

Are billionaires, like Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, and other rich and famous people (see YouTube video), doing enough to alleviate the suffering of poor people or should they do more?

[PHI 2200] Do animals have a moral sense?

According to Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR):

The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.

Now, experiments, like those showcased in this NOVA Science Now episode on Animal Morality, show that animals display moral and altruistic (selfless) behavior, such as sharing with others, helping strangers, and the like.



If these experiments really do show that animals have a (rudimentary) moral sense of right and wrong (e.g., a sense of fairness), would that undermine the thesis that there are no absolute or universal moral truths?

[PHI 2200] Sacrificing one for the good of many

Here are the results of the surveys we conducted in class today using Socrative:

One interesting thing to note about these results is that in both the Riots case (should you bear false witness against an innocent person to stop the riots?) and the Firing Squad case (should you shoot one person to spare the lives of the other four?) the utilitarian idea is sacrifice one to save many. But judgments about what one should do in these cases vary from 29/30 (97%) for "shouldn't bear false witness to stop the riots" to only 15/30 (50%) for "shouldn't shoot one to save four." Why is that?

[PHI 2200] The morality of the ice bucket challenge

Do you think that those who participate in the Ice Bucket Challenge are doing something morally good? That is, those who pour buckets of ice water on themselves for ALS should be praised for doing so. After all, in so doing, they are trying to support the fight against ALS.

If so, consider the following facts:

(1) Lots of water has been wasted for the ALS cause. Jason Ruiz writes:

"To put the waste this campaign has caused into simple terms, let’s just assume everyone is using a five gallon bucket. Now multiply that number by the more than 1.2 million videos shared on Facebook since June 1. Based on that assumption (5 x 1,200,000), over 6 million gallons of water have been poured out in the name of Lou Gehrig’s Disease. The average American household uses 320 gallons per day, which means that based on this estimation, nearly 19,000 homes’ daily water usage has been wasted. And that’s not even taking into account that videos posted online often depict multiple people, sometimes even entire sororities or fraternities, taking part in the ice bucket challenge, often using more than one bucket per video."

(2) Water scarcity is a global crisis. According to the UN:

"Around 700 million people in 43 countries suffer today from water scarcity. By 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the world's population could be living under water stressed conditions. With the existing climate change scenario, almost half the world's population will be living in areas of high water stress by 2030, including between 75 million and 250 million people in Africa. In addition, water scarcity in some arid and semi-arid places will displace between 24 million and 700 million people. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of water-stressed countries of any region."

In fact, it is estimated that "every 21 seconds a child dies from a water-related illness."

Do you think that these facts put the morality of the Ice Bucket Challenge into question? If so, why? If not, why not? 

[PHI 2200] On playing the 'Playing God' card

In The Suicide Tourist, Craig Ewert makes the following comment:

There are people who will look at this and say, "No, suicide is wrong. God has forbidden it. You cannot play God and take your own life." Well, all right, fine. But you know what? This ventilator is playing God. If I had lived without access to technology, chances are I would be dead now, all right? When premature babies are born, they are given intensive medical treatment. Their lives are saved because doctors and nurses are playing God. They're saying, essentially, "God's plan was that this person would die right now. We're thwarting that. We're playing God."

And you know, they never say, "We have to stop organ transplants. We have to stop saving premature babies. We have to let them die." Oh, no. For that, it's OK to play God. It's only when it might ease somebody's suffering that, "Oh, we can't play God" comes out.

Ewert's comment can be construed as an argument as follows:

1. If it is morally impermissible to "play God" in order to ease the suffering of a terminal patient, then it is morally impermissible to "play God" in order to save a premature baby.
2. It is morally permissible to "play God" in order to save the life of a premature baby.
3. Therefore, it is morally permissible to "play God" in order to ease the suffering of a terminal patient.

What do you make of this argument? Is it sound?

[PHI 2200] Is virtue ethics vicious?

In this Elucidations podcast, Julia Annas talks about virtue ethics and says that to be told to do the right thing is not helpful at all until we know what the right thing to do is. To be told to do the honest thing, however, is helpful because we know a lot about honesty (as well as other virtues) from the way we are brought up.

But how can we acquire this know-how about virtues? After all, to be an honest person is to be the kind of person who does honest things. But one supposedly becomes honest by doing honest things. So how would one know how to do honest things before one is an honest person?

In other words, if an honest person is a person who is reliably disposed to do honest things, and the know-how about honesty is acquired from upbringing, then how can one become an honest person (i.e., develop the reliable disposition to act honestly) before one knows how to act honestly (given that one is not yet an honest person)?

It does not seem helpful to say that one learns about honesty from others as one is brought up, for the same question can be raised about others. That is, for any given person, how did that person acquire the know-how to act honestly? If we say "from being brought up by others," then we seem to get into a vicious regress. How did others acquire that know-how?

If this is correct, then is it really more helpful to be told "do the honest thing" than to be told "do the right thing," as Annas claims?

[PHI 2200] Survey Results

Here are the results of the surveys we conducted in Ethics class today using Socrative:

The Borrowed Gun Case

The Riots Case

The Firing Squad Case

I think there are two interesting points to make about these results:

• Even though in all three cases an innocent person would be harmed if you return the borrowed gun, bear false witness, and shoot one, judgments about what you should do vary significantly from 90% against returning the borrowed gun to 77% against bearing false witness to only 58% against shooting one. Why is that so?
• Even though you have to take direct action and shoot one person, as opposed to returning a borrowed gun or bearing false witness, 42% of you judged that you should shoot one, which is a significant difference from 23% in favor of bearing false witness in the riots case, and an even more significant difference from 10% in favor of returning the borrowed gun in the borrowed gun case. Why is that so?

[PHI 1000] Born Bad

To be bad, does one have to do bad deeds? Or can one be bad without doing bad deeds?

Suppose that Mallory has never done anything bad in her life. She never lies, cheats, steals, tortures, kills, etc. However, she does derive great pleasure from seeing others suffer. Watching a kitten run over by a truck makes her feel great. She enjoys watching people and animals in pain. She never actually caused anyone any pain. But she really likes to watch sentient beings suffer.

Is Mallory a bad person?

[PHI 2200] It's not personal, it's strictly business

In Hunting the Nightmare Bacteria, Frontline reports that pharmaceutical companies are not investing in developing new antibiotics at a time when bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics are spreading fast and are estimated to be responsible for more deaths per year than AIDS.

For example, Dr. Charles Knirsch, Pfizer’s vice president of clinical research, explains his company's decision thus:

Do pharmaceutical companies have to do only what their investors require of them? Or do they have a moral duty to invest in antibiotics research, even if antibiotics do not bring as much profit as other kinds of drugs, such as cholesterol drugs and psychiatric drugs, in order to save lives?

[PHI 2200] Those Who Can’t Do, Teach

In this Philosophy Bites podcast, Eric Schwitzgebel discusses his work on the ethical behavior of moral philosophers. Schwitzgebel's work shows that moral philosophers are no more likely to behave morally (e.g., respond to emails from students in a timely manner, avoid eating meat, vote, etc.) than other professors. Is this a problem?




Schwitzgebel mentions one argument which purports to show that this fact about moral philosophers is not a problem. The argument goes something like this:

1. It would be unfair to demand that moral philosophers practice what they preach.
2. We should not demand what is not fair.
3. Therefore, we should not demand that moral philosophers practice what they preach.

What do you think of this argument? Would the same argument apply to other professors, say, math professors? That is, if it is unfair to demand that moral philosophers be good persons, morally speaking, is it also unfair to demand that math professors be good mathematicians?

[PHI 2200] Don't dictators deserve to be entertained?

Kanye West performed at the wedding reception for the grandson of Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, while Jennifer Lopez sang Happy Birthday to the president of Turkmenistan.

The Colbert Report
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What, if anything, is morally objectionable about the actions of Kanye West and Jennifer Lopez?

[PHI 2200] Can "weakness" be a virtue?

One of the reasons in favor of a military operation in Syria, it seems, is that the US would look weak if it doesn't act against Syria.

The Daily Show with Jon Stewart
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Jon Stewart raises an interesting question: "Why does holding back look like weakness? Isn't it maturity?" In other words, for the stronger side in a conflict, would the virtuous thing to do be to attack with force or to refrain from attacking?

[PHI 2200] The Reverse Experience Machine

Robert Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment is supposed to show that motivational hedonism, the view that people are motivated only by experiences of pleasure and pain, is false. Nozick's argument from the experience machine is supposed to go roughly like this:

1. If all that matters to us are experiences of pleasure and pain, then we would want to get into the experience machine.
2. But we wouldn't want to get into the experience machine.
3. Therefore, it is not the case that all that matters to us are experiences of pleasure and pain.

Indeed, most people say that they would not want to get into the experience machine. Now consider the reverse experience machine.





In this case, most people say that they would prefer to stay in the machine. If it is true that most people simply prefer to stick with the life they already have, does that undermine Nozick's argument against hedonism? If so, how?

[PHI 2200] I don't want to impose but...

Over at Steinblog, Jesse Steinberg discusses an interesting argument from Russ Shafer-Landau's The Fundamentals of Ethics that goes like this:

1. If there were a universal ethic, then that would make it okay for some people to impose their views on others.
2. But that's not okay at all.
3. Therefore, there is no universal ethic.

I think that the term 'impose' is problematic here.

So what if we replace it with 'persuade'. Then the argument would run as follows:

1. If there were a universal ethic, then that would make it okay for some people to (or at least try to) persuade others that their moral views are worthy of acceptance.
2. But that's not okay at all.
3. Therefore, there is no universal ethic.

This argument is also formally valid. But do the premises seem more or less plausible now?

[PHI 2200] Beyond Trayvon

The fallout over the acquittal of George Zimmerman raises interesting philosophical questions:

Does the moral outrage over the verdict indicate that justice was not served? Should laws reflect the moral attitudes of the people? If a law does not reflect the moral attitudes of the people, does that mean the law is unjust?

[PHI 2200] God Bless America

In God Bless America, Fred is sick and tired of the ills of American society and sets out to rid it from its rude, obnoxious, and otherwise depraved citizens.

Is Fred being inconsistent in wanting to rid society of its morally corrupt while doing so in a morally questionable way (i.e., mass murder)? Or is there a way to square Fred's beliefs with his actions?

[PHI 2200] The Sisyphus Problem

In this TED talk, Peter Singer likens the modern consumer to Sisyphus. Just as Sisyphus has to roll a boulder up a hill over and over again, the modern consumer has to work hard in order to earn money and then spend it over and over again.




Singer argues that effective altruism is a way out of the Sisyphus Problem. But why is it that the effective altruist is not faced with the same kind of problem? After all, the effective altruist also has to work hard in order to earn money and then give it away over and over again. As far as the Sisyphus Problem is concerned, why does it matter whether one spends one's money or gives it away?

[PHI 2200] Fight fire with fire?

According to The Guardian:

Professor Stephen Hawking is backing the academic boycott of Israel by pulling out of a conference hosted by Israeli president Shimon Peres in Jerusalem as a protest at Israel's treatment of Palestinians.

One of the ways in which Palestinians are being mistreated by Israel is collective punishment. For example, according to Amnesty International, Israel uses house demolitions as a form of collective punishment.

Now, if a boycott is a form of collective punishment, too, insofar as innocent people are being punished for the actions of their government, which they may or may not support, are those who support the academic boycott of Israel guilty of being inconsistent? That is, are they protesting the collective punishment of Palestinians by collectively punishing Israeli academics? Or are they fighting fire with fire?