Friday, May 4, 2012

[PHI 1000] Strawson's Basic Argument

Galen Strawson calls the following argument "The Basic Argument" for why humans are not ultimately morally responsible for their actions:
  1. You do what you do—in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are.
  2. So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain mental respects.
  3. But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
  4. So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.
Strawson thinks that premise 3 is true because the way we are is ultimately determined by genetic inheritance and early experience, both of which are beyond our control.

So far so good. But then Strawson says something rather puzzling:
According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false. We can’t be ultimately morally responsible either way.
What does he mean by that?

First, isn't premise 1 a deterministic premise? Premise 1 says that what you do is determined by the way you are. In other words, you do what you do because of the way you are at that time. The way you are, then, determines your actions. So, if determinism is false, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Second, doesn't the support for premise 3 come from a deterministic claim according to which the way you are is determined by genetic inheritance and early experience? Since the way you are is determined by factors over which you have no control (namely, genetic inheritance and early experience), you cannot be ultimately morally responsible for the way you are. So, if determinism is false, then premise 3 of the Basic Argument seems to be false as well.

Of course, Strawson rightly points out that, even if indeterminism is true (i.e., the way we are and what we do are indeterminate), it doesn't follow that we are ultimately morally responsible for our actions, since, in order to be responsible for our actions, we have to be in control of the way we are. But we cannot be in control of the way we are if the way we are is indeterminate. Still, if the way we are and our actions are indeterminate, then premise 1 of the Basic Argument seems to be false, since that premise says that what we do is determined by the way we are.

So what does Strawson mean when he says that "According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false"?

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