In a Gettier case, a subject has a justified belief that turns out to be true as a matter of luck. For example, S looks at a rock that looks like a sheep and comes to believe that there's a sheep in the meadow. Unbeknownst to S, there is actually a sheep behind that rock that looks like a sheep, so S's belief is true. S's belief is also justified in virtue of being based on what S sees. However, S's belief that there's a sheep in the meadow doesn't amount to knowledge because S's belief is merely accidentally true or true as a matter of bad epistemic luck, or so say most epistemologists.
Let's look at the proposition in question more closely, namely, 'there's a sheep in the meadow'. What makes it true? Well, the fact that there is actually a sheep in the meadow, even though S doesn't know that. S is looking at a rock that looks like a sheep. In other words, there is a mismatch between the external conditions that make 'there's a sheep in the meadow' true, which are that there is an actual sheep in the meadow, and what goes on in S's head, which is that the referent of 'sheep', as far as S is concerned, is a rock that looks like a sheep, not a sheep.
Taking into account what 'sheep' actually refers to, then, it turns out that 'there's a sheep in the meadow' is true but it is not S's actual belief, whereas 'there's a rock that looks like a sheep in the meadow' is true but it is not accidentally true. If this is correct, then this Gettier case does not pose a problem to the Justified True Belief (JTB) analysis of knowledge.
What do you think of this response to the problem posed by Gettier cases like the sheep in the meadow case?