Tuesday, June 26, 2012

[PL 431] We care a lot (well, at least some of us)

According to Virginia Held, one of the major features of the "ethics of care" is that
the ethics of care values emotion rather than rejects it. Not all emotion is valued, of course, but in contrast with the dominant rationalist approaches, such emotions as sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as the kind of moral emotions that need to be cultivated not only to help in the implementation of the dictates of reason but to better ascertain what morality recommends.
From the perspective of care ethics, then, it is morally good to be sympathetic and sensitive toward others. In short, it is morally good to care for others.


But what about people who simply don't feel sympathy toward other people? From the perspective of care ethics, are we committed to saying that misanthropes are morally bad people? And what about people who cannot feel empathy? From the perspective of care ethics, are we committed to saying that autistic children are not, and cannot be, morally good people?

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