[HIST 2297] Kuhn's incommensurability arguments

In Just the Arguments (2011), Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Michael Bruce provide very useful reconstructions of Kuhn's incommensurability arguments. The first one goes like this:

1. If an emerging paradigm becomes the dominant one not by scientific proof but by majority acceptance or intuitive appeal, then the transition from one paradigm to another is not rationally decided.
2. An emerging paradigm becomes dominant by majority acceptance or intuitive appeal.
3. Therefore, the transition from one paradigm to another is not rationally decided (modus ponens, 1, 2).

The second argument goes like this:

1. Scientific terms refer to things and have meaning through a network of meaning.
2. If paradigms were commensurable, then terms would still refer to the same things in new paradigms; for example, "mass" in Newton's theories would be equivalent to "mass" in Einstein's theories.
3. Terms do not refer to the same things in new paradigms; for example, "mass" is not equivalent in Newton's and Einstein's theories (and neither is a special case of the other), and some things (e.g., phlogiston) are eliminated outright.
4. Therefore, paradigms are incommensurable (modus tollens, 2, 3).
5. If paradigms are incommensurable, then science does not more closely approximate the truth over time.
6. Therefore, science does not more closely approximate the truth over time (modus ponens, 5, 1).

What do you make of these arguments?