In Philosophical Explanations, Nozick writes:
The idea here is this: You believe that p on the basis of S’s assertion that p. I believe that not-p on the basis of S’s assertion that not-p. S knows nothing about the subject matter to which p and not-p are related. Do you know that p? Do I know that not-p?
In both cases, Nozick says, the answer is NO. For Nozick, you don’t know that p and I don’t know that not-p because our beliefs do not track the truth. That is, if p weren’t the case, you would still believe it, since this is what S said to you, and if not-p weren’t the case, I would still believe it, since this is what S said to me.
Do you agree with Nozick? Or is there another explanation for why you don’t know that p and I don’t know that not-p? Does it have anything to do with the fact that S knows nothing about the subject matter in question (even though you and I don’t know that)?
After contemplating on the question and using the analogue from Gettier's Problem, I have to agree with Nozick.
ReplyDeleteWhen someone sees a sheeplike stone in a forest, that someone will think that there is a sheep in the forest. However, there is a real sheep but is concealed behind the sheeplike stone and that someone did not see the real sheep. So in above case, there really is a sheep in the forest. But the person in question does not really have knowledge because it was merely a lucky instance.
Same problem applied to the example illustrated by Nozick. Both you and I knew p and ~p according to a draw of luck or chance in which we cannot track the truth because of S's assertions.
I think that S plays a role in the problem. In my opinion, for the one who have the true answer (let's say p and you knows p since S told you p), it is as if you see the p-like answer due to S's assertion but not the real p. In this case S's assertion of p is analogous to the sheeplike stone in Gettier's case.
Sai, do you mean that the grounds for p (e.g., seeing a rock that looks like a sheep or being told by S that p is the case) are misleading? If so, would you agree that a belief that is grounded in misleading evidence cannot amount to knowledge?
DeleteI agree that the belief that is grounded in misleading evidence cannot amount to knowledge because misleading evidence will usually amount to misleading conclusion and therefore misleading knowledge. Even if this misleading evidence led to true knowledge, it is nothing short of a stroke of luck. In this instance, knowing is no longer a justified true belief just like in the case of a guy knowing the outcomes of a coin-toss by guessing.
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