Wednesday, April 9, 2014

[PHI 3000] A simplified version of the ontological argument?

In this short paper, Gareth Matthews and Lynne Rudder Baker offer what they take to be a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument for the existence of God. They present the argument as a dialogue but it takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum (as St. Anselm's original argument does):
  1. God (i.e., a being than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
  2. If God does not exist, then God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
  3. It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
  4. If God has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a being greater than God can be conceived, namely, a being that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
  5. Something greater than God can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
  6. Therefore, God exists.
According to Matthews and Rudder Baker, this is a simplified version of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument because it avoids the question of whether existence is a predicate. Instead, they argue, this simplified version of the argument appeals to the distinction between mediated and unmediated causal powers. But why exactly is it "greater" to have unmediated causal powers (and "greater" in what sense)? In other words, why think that premise (3) is true?

More importantly, does this "simplified" version of the Ontological Argument avoid Gaunilo's objection? Gaunilo pointed out that St. Anselm's reasoning can be applied to any thing whatsoever, even things that are clearly imaginary. For example, we can define Pegasus as that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived. Then we can apply the same reasoning to "prove" the existence of Pegasus by simply replacing 'God' with 'Pegasus' thus:
  1. Pegasus (i.e., that winged horse than which nothing greater can be conceived) does not exist. [Assumption for reductio]
  2. If Pegasus does not exist, then Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers. [Premise]
  3. It is greater to have unmediated than mediated causal powers. [Premise]
  4. If Pegasus has mediated—not unmediated—causal powers, then a winged horse greater than Pegasus can be conceived, namely, a winged horse that has unmediated casual powers. [from (2) & (3)]
  5. Something greater than Pegasus can and cannot be conceived. [from (1) & (4)]
  6. Therefore, Pegasus exists.
If this is correct, is the "simplified version of the Ontological Argument" really an improvement upon St. Anselm's original argument?

5 comments:

  1. It is “greater” to have unmediated causal powers because then, God would not just have powers through the beliefs of people in him. He would not just be in the mind or as the fool says “an object of the imagination”; he would be present beyond our mind, and in our reality. Therefore, having unmediated causal powers proves God’s existence, so the fool believes. Premise three is added in order to set a distinction line between God in the understanding alone and God in both the reality and the mind. We need to believe premise three is true to place unmediated causal powers at a higher bar than mediated causal powers and make it seem like a more concrete concept for God’s existence. If God exists in both the mind and reality, then it shows that there was a reason for which he is in our minds: his existence in reality caused us to conceive him in our minds. Unmediated causal powers are placed at a higher status to further strengthen the case for God’s existence.
    Matthew and Baker avoid Gaunilo’s objection because even the simplified argument can be used to prove the existence of something else like Pegasus, similar to how Anselm’s argument can be used to prove the existence of something else like the perfect island. The contradiction of something that can and cannot be conceived to prove that something exists is not a good approach because in this way we can prove that all other supernatural, absurd things exist. Therefore, Matthew and Baker did not improve upon Anselm’s argument but I think they just simplified it by substituting the clause of mediated and unmediated causal powers for the clause of the existence of God in reality and/or the mind from Anselm’s argument.

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  2. No, the "simplified version of the Ontological Argument" is not an improvement upon St. Anselm's original argument. If the same argument is so broad that it can be applied to prove the existence of anything, even things we know to be untrue, then clearly it is an invalid argument. While it avoids the question of existence being a predicate it does not solve the problem altogether.

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  3. It is greater to have unmediated causal power because it is an attribute of existence, rather than the mediated causal power of an idea. “Greater” in this sense means more powerful, and as in a direct effect is greater than an indirect effect. For example, in a line of dominoes, when the first domino is pushed (A), it starts a chain of events that results in the fall of the last domino (B). Here, one can say that A is an indirect cause of B. However, if the two events are contiguous, then one can say that A is a direct (unmediated) cause of B. Therefore, the event A is greater in its cause of event B in the second scenario than in the first. If Gaunilo’s objection is correct and can be applied to this simplified version of the Ontological argument, then it is not really an improvement on the original argument because it does not remove the flaw that the argument can be applied to anything (e.g. Pegasus). The simplified argument removes the problem of existence as a predicate, but by using unmediated causal power as an attribute for existence, it brings up the problem of assuming that this attribute is exclusive to God. Also, one can imagine or entertain the idea of the existence of any great being with unmediated causal power, but that does not mean that such a being actually exists.

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  4. St. Anselm’s ontological argument discusses the existence of God. According to this reductio argument, God is the greatest being we can think of. The argument indicates that God is the being that is most powerful, meaning, that we cannot conceive a being more powerful than him. Therefore, when we think of God, we have to say that his power is unmediated. The third premise is very vague in the sense that we cannot fully understand why unmediated power is greater than mediated powers.

    This simplified version of this argument does not avoid Gaunilo’s objection, but Gaunilo’s objection is wrong to begin with. When talking about God (i.e. the greatest conceivable being), we understand that existence is an absolute quality in him, for you cannot be the ultimate being with ultimate power if you don’t exist. When talking about Pegasus (the winged horse), existence is not an essential quality in the idea we have of him, but existence is an essential quality of the greatest conceivable being, God.

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  5. Matthews and Baker’s version of the Onotological Argument focuses on the distinction between mediated and unmediated casual powers as opposed to whether or not existence is a predicate. This does not improve the argument but is merely a simplified version of it. This invalid deductive argument fails to make the conclusion more probable leaving lots of room for error such as Gaunilo pointed out in his objection. This argument is general and anything can be applied to this argument which leads to the conclusion that even some mythological creatures are real when we know that to be false. This does not help “prove” God’s existence but instead leaves the same questions unanswered.

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